Government procurement and financial statement certification: Evidence from private firms in emerging economies

In this paper, we examine the monitoring role of government customers in emerging markets, a setting where public procurement is significant but the procurement institutions are weak. In these countries, financial statement certifications could be an important mechanism for a private firm to facilit...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of international business studies 2021-06, Vol.52 (4), p.718-745
Hauptverfasser: Hope, Ole-Kristian, Jiang, Shushu, Vyas, Dushyantkumar
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 745
container_issue 4
container_start_page 718
container_title Journal of international business studies
container_volume 52
creator Hope, Ole-Kristian
Jiang, Shushu
Vyas, Dushyantkumar
description In this paper, we examine the monitoring role of government customers in emerging markets, a setting where public procurement is significant but the procurement institutions are weak. In these countries, financial statement certifications could be an important mechanism for a private firm to facilitate contracting with governments. Employing a sample of private firms across 98 emerging economies, we first document in-depth private-firm audit regulations for each country. We find that firms are more likely to have financial statements certified by an external auditor when they have government contracts. We further find that the association is less pronounced when governments have weaker monitoring incentives – when suppliers are subject to monitoring from tax authorities or creditors, when government contracting officials receive bribes, and when government spending is less transparent. We corroborate our inferences using the staggered adoption of an E-Procurement system to infer changes in governments’ monitoring incentives and several other robustness checks.
doi_str_mv 10.1057/s41267-020-00382-2
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2535752734</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>48686564</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>48686564</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c374t-34173b1dce8c15abd6dfd7616ee7e4cb1091ea7a8507c3e92c3bf3f964880f43</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kE9LAzEQxYMoWKtfQBAKnqOT_1nwIkWrUPDSe8hmE9mlzdYkK_jt3XZFb85lhuH95g0PoWsCdwSEus-cUKkwUMAATFNMT9CMcKWxrCo4RTMArjAVIM_RRc4djMUEnaGHVf_pU9z5WBb71Lsh-eNsY7MIbbTRtXa7yMWWae98Km1onS1tHy_RWbDb7K9--hxtnp82yxe8flu9Lh_X2DHFC2acKFaTxnntiLB1I5vQKEmk98pzVxOoiLfKagHKMV9Rx-rAQiW51hA4m6Pb6ez44MfgczFdP6Q4OhoqmFCCKnZQ0UnlUp9z8sHsU7uz6csQMIeQzBSSGUMyx5AMHSE2QXkUx3ef_k7_S91MVJdLn359uJZaCsnZN6bMdCA</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2535752734</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Government procurement and financial statement certification: Evidence from private firms in emerging economies</title><source>PAIS Index</source><source>SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings</source><creator>Hope, Ole-Kristian ; Jiang, Shushu ; Vyas, Dushyantkumar</creator><creatorcontrib>Hope, Ole-Kristian ; Jiang, Shushu ; Vyas, Dushyantkumar</creatorcontrib><description>In this paper, we examine the monitoring role of government customers in emerging markets, a setting where public procurement is significant but the procurement institutions are weak. In these countries, financial statement certifications could be an important mechanism for a private firm to facilitate contracting with governments. Employing a sample of private firms across 98 emerging economies, we first document in-depth private-firm audit regulations for each country. We find that firms are more likely to have financial statements certified by an external auditor when they have government contracts. We further find that the association is less pronounced when governments have weaker monitoring incentives – when suppliers are subject to monitoring from tax authorities or creditors, when government contracting officials receive bribes, and when government spending is less transparent. We corroborate our inferences using the staggered adoption of an E-Procurement system to infer changes in governments’ monitoring incentives and several other robustness checks.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0047-2506</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1478-6990</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1057/s41267-020-00382-2</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>London: Springer Science + Business Media</publisher><subject>Auditors ; Bribery ; Business and Management ; Business Strategy/Leadership ; Certification ; Companies ; Contracting ; Creditors ; Customers ; Electronic procurement ; Emerging markets ; Financial institutions ; Financial statements ; Government contracts ; Government purchasing ; Government spending ; Incentives ; International Business ; Management ; Offenses ; Organization ; Public finance ; Purchasing ; REGULAR ARTICLES ; Regulation ; Robustness ; Taxation</subject><ispartof>Journal of international business studies, 2021-06, Vol.52 (4), p.718-745</ispartof><rights>2020 Academy of International Business</rights><rights>Academy of International Business 2020</rights><rights>Academy of International Business 2020.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c374t-34173b1dce8c15abd6dfd7616ee7e4cb1091ea7a8507c3e92c3bf3f964880f43</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c374t-34173b1dce8c15abd6dfd7616ee7e4cb1091ea7a8507c3e92c3bf3f964880f43</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41267-020-00382-2$$EPDF$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41267-020-00382-2$$EHTML$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,777,781,27847,27905,27906,41469,42538,51300</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Hope, Ole-Kristian</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jiang, Shushu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Vyas, Dushyantkumar</creatorcontrib><title>Government procurement and financial statement certification: Evidence from private firms in emerging economies</title><title>Journal of international business studies</title><addtitle>J Int Bus Stud</addtitle><description>In this paper, we examine the monitoring role of government customers in emerging markets, a setting where public procurement is significant but the procurement institutions are weak. In these countries, financial statement certifications could be an important mechanism for a private firm to facilitate contracting with governments. Employing a sample of private firms across 98 emerging economies, we first document in-depth private-firm audit regulations for each country. We find that firms are more likely to have financial statements certified by an external auditor when they have government contracts. We further find that the association is less pronounced when governments have weaker monitoring incentives – when suppliers are subject to monitoring from tax authorities or creditors, when government contracting officials receive bribes, and when government spending is less transparent. We corroborate our inferences using the staggered adoption of an E-Procurement system to infer changes in governments’ monitoring incentives and several other robustness checks.</description><subject>Auditors</subject><subject>Bribery</subject><subject>Business and Management</subject><subject>Business Strategy/Leadership</subject><subject>Certification</subject><subject>Companies</subject><subject>Contracting</subject><subject>Creditors</subject><subject>Customers</subject><subject>Electronic procurement</subject><subject>Emerging markets</subject><subject>Financial institutions</subject><subject>Financial statements</subject><subject>Government contracts</subject><subject>Government purchasing</subject><subject>Government spending</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>International Business</subject><subject>Management</subject><subject>Offenses</subject><subject>Organization</subject><subject>Public finance</subject><subject>Purchasing</subject><subject>REGULAR ARTICLES</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>Robustness</subject><subject>Taxation</subject><issn>0047-2506</issn><issn>1478-6990</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE9LAzEQxYMoWKtfQBAKnqOT_1nwIkWrUPDSe8hmE9mlzdYkK_jt3XZFb85lhuH95g0PoWsCdwSEus-cUKkwUMAATFNMT9CMcKWxrCo4RTMArjAVIM_RRc4djMUEnaGHVf_pU9z5WBb71Lsh-eNsY7MIbbTRtXa7yMWWae98Km1onS1tHy_RWbDb7K9--hxtnp82yxe8flu9Lh_X2DHFC2acKFaTxnntiLB1I5vQKEmk98pzVxOoiLfKagHKMV9Rx-rAQiW51hA4m6Pb6ez44MfgczFdP6Q4OhoqmFCCKnZQ0UnlUp9z8sHsU7uz6csQMIeQzBSSGUMyx5AMHSE2QXkUx3ef_k7_S91MVJdLn359uJZaCsnZN6bMdCA</recordid><startdate>20210601</startdate><enddate>20210601</enddate><creator>Hope, Ole-Kristian</creator><creator>Jiang, Shushu</creator><creator>Vyas, Dushyantkumar</creator><general>Springer Science + Business Media</general><general>Palgrave Macmillan UK</general><general>Palgrave Macmillan</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>8BF</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8FQ</scope><scope>8FV</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AXJJW</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FREBS</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0Q</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20210601</creationdate><title>Government procurement and financial statement certification</title><author>Hope, Ole-Kristian ; Jiang, Shushu ; Vyas, Dushyantkumar</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c374t-34173b1dce8c15abd6dfd7616ee7e4cb1091ea7a8507c3e92c3bf3f964880f43</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Auditors</topic><topic>Bribery</topic><topic>Business and Management</topic><topic>Business Strategy/Leadership</topic><topic>Certification</topic><topic>Companies</topic><topic>Contracting</topic><topic>Creditors</topic><topic>Customers</topic><topic>Electronic procurement</topic><topic>Emerging markets</topic><topic>Financial institutions</topic><topic>Financial statements</topic><topic>Government contracts</topic><topic>Government purchasing</topic><topic>Government spending</topic><topic>Incentives</topic><topic>International Business</topic><topic>Management</topic><topic>Offenses</topic><topic>Organization</topic><topic>Public finance</topic><topic>Purchasing</topic><topic>REGULAR ARTICLES</topic><topic>Regulation</topic><topic>Robustness</topic><topic>Taxation</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Hope, Ole-Kristian</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jiang, Shushu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Vyas, Dushyantkumar</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>European Business Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Canadian Business &amp; Current Affairs Database</collection><collection>Canadian Business &amp; Current Affairs Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Asian &amp; European Business Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Asian &amp; European Business Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>European Business Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Journal of international business studies</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Hope, Ole-Kristian</au><au>Jiang, Shushu</au><au>Vyas, Dushyantkumar</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Government procurement and financial statement certification: Evidence from private firms in emerging economies</atitle><jtitle>Journal of international business studies</jtitle><stitle>J Int Bus Stud</stitle><date>2021-06-01</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>52</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>718</spage><epage>745</epage><pages>718-745</pages><issn>0047-2506</issn><eissn>1478-6990</eissn><abstract>In this paper, we examine the monitoring role of government customers in emerging markets, a setting where public procurement is significant but the procurement institutions are weak. In these countries, financial statement certifications could be an important mechanism for a private firm to facilitate contracting with governments. Employing a sample of private firms across 98 emerging economies, we first document in-depth private-firm audit regulations for each country. We find that firms are more likely to have financial statements certified by an external auditor when they have government contracts. We further find that the association is less pronounced when governments have weaker monitoring incentives – when suppliers are subject to monitoring from tax authorities or creditors, when government contracting officials receive bribes, and when government spending is less transparent. We corroborate our inferences using the staggered adoption of an E-Procurement system to infer changes in governments’ monitoring incentives and several other robustness checks.</abstract><cop>London</cop><pub>Springer Science + Business Media</pub><doi>10.1057/s41267-020-00382-2</doi><tpages>28</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0047-2506
ispartof Journal of international business studies, 2021-06, Vol.52 (4), p.718-745
issn 0047-2506
1478-6990
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_2535752734
source PAIS Index; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings
subjects Auditors
Bribery
Business and Management
Business Strategy/Leadership
Certification
Companies
Contracting
Creditors
Customers
Electronic procurement
Emerging markets
Financial institutions
Financial statements
Government contracts
Government purchasing
Government spending
Incentives
International Business
Management
Offenses
Organization
Public finance
Purchasing
REGULAR ARTICLES
Regulation
Robustness
Taxation
title Government procurement and financial statement certification: Evidence from private firms in emerging economies
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-19T03%3A33%3A54IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Government%20procurement%20and%20financial%20statement%20certification:%20Evidence%20from%20private%20firms%20in%20emerging%20economies&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20international%20business%20studies&rft.au=Hope,%20Ole-Kristian&rft.date=2021-06-01&rft.volume=52&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=718&rft.epage=745&rft.pages=718-745&rft.issn=0047-2506&rft.eissn=1478-6990&rft_id=info:doi/10.1057/s41267-020-00382-2&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E48686564%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2535752734&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=48686564&rfr_iscdi=true