Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms: Evidence from an emerging economy
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Managerial auditing journal 2017-09, Vol.32 (7), p.658-681 |
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description | PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies.Design/methodology/approachUsing substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability.FindingsWhile AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations.Research limitations/implicationsThe main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system.Originality/valueTo the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1108/MAJ-08-2016-1423 |
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In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies.Design/methodology/approachUsing substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability.FindingsWhile AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations.Research limitations/implicationsThe main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system.Originality/valueTo the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0268-6902</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1758-7735</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1108/MAJ-08-2016-1423</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Bradford: Emerald Group Publishing Limited</publisher><subject>Audit committees ; Boards of directors ; Capital markets ; Corporate governance ; Economic growth ; Emerging markets ; GDP ; Gross Domestic Product ; Hypotheses ; Institutional investments ; Investors ; Securities markets ; Stock exchanges</subject><ispartof>Managerial auditing journal, 2017-09, Vol.32 (7), p.658-681</ispartof><rights>Emerald Publishing Limited 2017</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c224t-582f04040ecf89810d4ddc068b9e899679f7ec3dbd119d0d8c0ee704847413783</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,961,27903,27904</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Hassan, Yousef</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hijazi, Rafiq</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Naser, Kamal</creatorcontrib><title>Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms: Evidence from an emerging economy</title><title>Managerial auditing journal</title><description>PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies.Design/methodology/approachUsing substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability.FindingsWhile AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations.Research limitations/implicationsThe main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system.Originality/valueTo the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.</description><subject>Audit committees</subject><subject>Boards of directors</subject><subject>Capital markets</subject><subject>Corporate governance</subject><subject>Economic growth</subject><subject>Emerging markets</subject><subject>GDP</subject><subject>Gross Domestic Product</subject><subject>Hypotheses</subject><subject>Institutional investments</subject><subject>Investors</subject><subject>Securities markets</subject><subject>Stock exchanges</subject><issn>0268-6902</issn><issn>1758-7735</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2017</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><recordid>eNotkM1LxDAUxIMouK7ePRY8R18-2iTHZf1mxYN6Dt3k1e2ybWqSCv73tihzGJg3PIYfIZcMrhkDffOyeqagKQdWUSa5OCILpkpNlRLlMVkArzStDPBTcpbSHoBxyeSCvN0GTEU9-jYXLnRdmzNikcZtym0eMxYhzvlwwA77XIS8wzmIQ4j1dP0M3xj7undYdOh2dd-mLp2Tk6Y-JLz49yX5uL97Xz_SzevD03q1oY5zmWmpeQNyErpGG83AS-8dVHprUBtTKdModMJvPWPGg9cOEBVILZVkQmmxJFd_f4cYvkZM2e7DOK05JMtLIQRXnM0t-Gu5GFKK2Nghtl0dfywDO6OzEzo72YzOzujEL6SkYfw</recordid><startdate>20170925</startdate><enddate>20170925</enddate><creator>Hassan, Yousef</creator><creator>Hijazi, Rafiq</creator><creator>Naser, Kamal</creator><general>Emerald Group Publishing Limited</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7X1</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ANIOZ</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K8~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20170925</creationdate><title>Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms</title><author>Hassan, Yousef ; Hijazi, Rafiq ; Naser, Kamal</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c224t-582f04040ecf89810d4ddc068b9e899679f7ec3dbd119d0d8c0ee704847413783</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2017</creationdate><topic>Audit committees</topic><topic>Boards of directors</topic><topic>Capital markets</topic><topic>Corporate governance</topic><topic>Economic growth</topic><topic>Emerging markets</topic><topic>GDP</topic><topic>Gross Domestic Product</topic><topic>Hypotheses</topic><topic>Institutional investments</topic><topic>Investors</topic><topic>Securities markets</topic><topic>Stock exchanges</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Hassan, Yousef</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hijazi, Rafiq</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Naser, Kamal</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Global News & ABI/Inform Professional</collection><collection>Trade PRO</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>Accounting & Tax Database (Proquest)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Accounting, Tax & Banking Collection (ProQuest)</collection><collection>AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>DELNET Management Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Managerial auditing journal</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Hassan, Yousef</au><au>Hijazi, Rafiq</au><au>Naser, Kamal</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms: Evidence from an emerging economy</atitle><jtitle>Managerial auditing journal</jtitle><date>2017-09-25</date><risdate>2017</risdate><volume>32</volume><issue>7</issue><spage>658</spage><epage>681</epage><pages>658-681</pages><issn>0268-6902</issn><eissn>1758-7735</eissn><abstract>PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies.Design/methodology/approachUsing substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability.FindingsWhile AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations.Research limitations/implicationsThe main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system.Originality/valueTo the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.</abstract><cop>Bradford</cop><pub>Emerald Group Publishing Limited</pub><doi>10.1108/MAJ-08-2016-1423</doi><tpages>24</tpages></addata></record> |
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subjects | Audit committees Boards of directors Capital markets Corporate governance Economic growth Emerging markets GDP Gross Domestic Product Hypotheses Institutional investments Investors Securities markets Stock exchanges |
title | Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms: Evidence from an emerging economy |
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