Cooperation against all predictions
In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games, n players have binary choices: cooperation or non-cooperation. If at least k players cooperate, a public good is produced. The case k = n is the Stag Hunt game with the two pure strategy equilibria E1 (all players cooperate) and E0 (no player cooperates)...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economic inquiry 2021-07, Vol.59 (3), p.904-924 |
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| creator | Bolle, Friedel Spiller, Jörg |
| description | In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games, n players have binary choices: cooperation or non-cooperation. If at least k players cooperate, a public good is produced. The case k = n is the Stag Hunt game with the two pure strategy equilibria E1 (all players cooperate) and E0 (no player cooperates). In four rather diverse examples of four-player Stag Hunt games, three prominent concepts of equilibrium selection favor E0. Experiments, however, result in cooperation frequencies between 70.3% and 99.7%. Also for k < n, the selected equilibria clearly differ from experimental behavior. We interpret our observations by suggesting the concept Behavioral Equilibrium Selection. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/ecin.12976 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Economic inquiry, 2021-07, Vol.59 (3), p.904-924 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Wiley-Blackwell Journals |
| subjects | Cooperation Equilibrium equilibrium selection experiments Games global games payoff dominance Public good quantal response equilibria risk dominance Stag Hunt games |
| title | Cooperation against all predictions |
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