Reference‐dependent preferences, time inconsistency, and pay‐as‐you‐go pensions

The classic Aaron–Samuelson result argues that pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) pension schemes cannot coexist with higher‐return, private, retirement‐saving schemes. The ensuing literature shows if agents voluntarily undersave for retirement due to myopia or time‐inconsistency, then a paternalistic, rationale...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic inquiry 2021-07, Vol.59 (3), p.1008-1030
Hauptverfasser:	Andersen, Torben M., Bhattacharya, Joydeep, Liu, Qing
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	dynamic efficiency Inconsistency Kőszegi–Rabin Myopia Pensions reference‐dependence Retirement Savings Welfare
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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