An Empirical Analysis of Double Round Auctions

This article analyzes auctions that can feature two bidding rounds for the sale of a single good. In the first round, the seller, after analyzing the received bids, may elect to have k bidders rebid. The highest bidder in the second round then acquires the asset at the highest bid price. We use a sa...

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Veröffentlicht in:Real estate economics 2021-06, Vol.49 (2), p.531-555
Hauptverfasser: Kallberg, Jarl G., Liu, Crocker H., Nowak, Adam
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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