FAMILY CONTROL AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN BRAZILIAN LISTED COMPANIES: A RELATIONSHIP MEDIATED BY AGE

A family-owned company potentially represents the realm of the agency theory because, if on one side this kind of organization shows lower Type I agency conflicts due to the proximity between ownership and management, on the other side it emphasizes Type II conflicts, within ownership, between major...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Revista universo contábil 2019-11, Vol.15 (1), p.151
Hauptverfasser:	Tommasetti, Roberto, Macedo, Marcelo Alvaro Da Silva, Constantino, Fabricia De Farias da Silva, Sarlo Neto, Alfredo
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency theory Earnings Family owned businesses Shareholder relations
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!