Structural fund, endogenous move and commitment
In this paper, we extend the study on combined tax and infrastructure competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by asymmetric countries. We consider how a structural fund affects the endogenous move decision and show that the poor country prefers to be a follower only when the product...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | International tax and public finance 2021-04, Vol.28 (2), p.465-482 |
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| container_title | International tax and public finance |
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| creator | Eckel, Carsten Han, Yutao Hynes, Kate Zhang, Jin |
| description | In this paper, we extend the study on combined tax and infrastructure competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by asymmetric countries. We consider how a structural fund affects the endogenous move decision and show that the poor country prefers to be a follower only when the production function is sufficiently concave. We also analyse the effect of the structural fund on total welfare and design a commitment game to ensure that the socially optimal outcome is achieved. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10797-020-09641-2 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | International tax and public finance, 2021-04, Vol.28 (2), p.465-482 |
| issn | 0927-5940 1573-6970 |
| language | eng |
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| source | PAIS Index; SpringerNature Journals |
| subjects | Business Taxation/Tax Law Competition Economics Economics and Finance Endogenous GNI Gross National Income High income Infrastructure International taxation Low income groups Production functions Public Finance Regions Structural Fund Supranationalism Tax rates Taxes Welfare |
| title | Structural fund, endogenous move and commitment |
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