Nudging Charitable Giving: What (If Anything) Is Wrong With It?

Nudging techniques can help charities to increase donations. In this article, we first provide a systematic overview of prototypical nudges that promote charitable giving. Second, we argue that plenty of the ethical objections raised against nudges, such as the exploitation of power they involve and...

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Veröffentlicht in:Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly 2021-04, Vol.50 (2), p.353-371
Hauptverfasser: Ruehle, Rebecca C., Engelen, Bart, Archer, Alfred
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Nudging techniques can help charities to increase donations. In this article, we first provide a systematic overview of prototypical nudges that promote charitable giving. Second, we argue that plenty of the ethical objections raised against nudges, such as the exploitation of power they involve and the arguably intrusive and deceptive nature, are not specific to nudging itself. Carefully designing nudges can help to avoid these worries. Third, given that most concerns boil down to the worry that nudges infringe on people’s autonomy, we analyze when this could nevertheless be justified. We differentiate between perfect duties, imperfect duties, and supererogatory acts and argue that nudges are (a) morally permissible (even when they violate autonomy) when it comes to perfect duties and can (b) provide the best available strategy when it comes to imperfect duties. That said, we also analyze the conditions under which nudging charitable giving is impermissible.
ISSN:0899-7640
1552-7395
0899-7640
DOI:10.1177/0899764020954266