Is enterprise environmental protection investment responsibility or rent-seeking? Chinese evidence
Having enterprises engaged in environmentally friendly behavior is an important part of reducing negative environmental impacts. This study makes a quantitative analysis against the backdrop of China's transitional economic system. The results show that politically-connected enterprises signifi...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Environment and development economics 2021-04, Vol.26 (2), p.169-187 |
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| creator | Jiang, Xin-Feng Zhao, Chun-Xiang Ma, Jing-Juan Liu, Jian-Qiu Li, Si-Hai |
| description | Having enterprises engaged in environmentally friendly behavior is an important part of reducing negative environmental impacts. This study makes a quantitative analysis against the backdrop of China's transitional economic system. The results show that politically-connected enterprises significantly reduce environmental expenditure, but this only holds for state-owned enterprises; private enterprises with political connections spend significantly more. Analysis of the efficiency of environmental expenditure indicates that, for private enterprises, environmental spending is used as a way to maintain political connections, with rent-seeking as the likely motivation. Politically-connected private enterprises have not reduced their emissions to the same extent as state-owned enterprises, despite increased expenditure. Given the scale of environmental degradation in China during a period of massive economic and social upheaval, the results of this analysis provide a quantitative case for policy change: governments should shift focus to the results that environmental spending produces. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/S1355770X20000327 |
| format | Article |
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Politically-connected private enterprises have not reduced their emissions to the same extent as state-owned enterprises, despite increased expenditure. 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| ispartof | Environment and development economics, 2021-04, Vol.26 (2), p.169-187 |
| issn | 1355-770X 1469-4395 |
| language | eng |
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| source | PAIS Index; Cambridge Journals |
| subjects | Capital investments Economic analysis Economics Efficiency Environmental degradation Environmental impact Environmental protection Expenditures Government subsidies Investments Motivation Politics Pollution Private enterprise Property rights Public enterprise Quantitative analysis Reforms Regulation Rent-seeking |
| title | Is enterprise environmental protection investment responsibility or rent-seeking? Chinese evidence |
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