Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and the R&D Subsidy Policy

We reconsider the justifications of the R&D subsidies of Spencer and Brander (1983), by allowing firms to form a research joint venture (RJV) and license innovations. If governments offer unconditional subsidies, an RJV is formed and the strategic benefits of R&D subsidies vanish. Neverthele...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 2008-09, Vol.8 (1), p.20-17
Hauptverfasser:	Fan, Cuihong, Wolfstetter, Elmar G
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Government policy industrial organization Industrieforschung Innovation Innovations Joint Venture Joint ventures Licences Licensing Lizenz Oligopol patent licensing R&D Research & development Research and development Subsidies Taxation Technologiepolitik Ventures
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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