There is no ‘I’ in team: Career concerns, risk‐taking incentives, and team outcomes

The National Basketball Association contracting rules provide plausibly exogenous variation in career concerns near contract end. We use this setting to study how individual career concerns affect risk‐taking behavior and can sabotage team performance. Using the frequency and duration of player inju...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economics & management strategy 2021-02, Vol.30 (1), p.122-138
Hauptverfasser:	Ngo, Phong T. H., Roberts, Steven
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Basketball Contracts Falls Games Group performance Injuries Professional basketball Risk behavior Sabotage Sports injuries Teams
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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