Bad news for announcers, good news for rivals: Are rivals fully seizing transition‐period opportunities following announcers' top management turnovers?
Research summary This study analyzes whether and how the disruption of top management turnovers can affect not only turnover firms but also their intra‐industry rivals. It thus adds to the literature on both leader life cycles and competitive dynamics. Using a U.S. sample of 857 CEO turnovers, we fi...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Strategic management journal 2021-03, Vol.42 (3), p.579-607 |
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creator | Burchard, Cord H. Proelss, Juliane Schäffer, Utz Schweizer, Denis |
description | Research summary
This study analyzes whether and how the disruption of top management turnovers can affect not only turnover firms but also their intra‐industry rivals. It thus adds to the literature on both leader life cycles and competitive dynamics. Using a U.S. sample of 857 CEO turnovers, we find a period of relative stagnation for announcing companies following top management turnovers. We also find that intra‐industry rivals can use this period to their advantage. Semi‐structured interviews with seasoned CEOs, CFOs, and a board member from large publicly listed firms, as well as an extensive news search, support this notion. Intra‐industry rivals gain a competitive advantage that can result in positive abnormal stock returns and accounting performance. The intra‐industry outperformance is greater for forced turnovers.
Managerial summary
The departure of a company's CEO, forced or not, is usually a disruptive event for a company, as the successor must adapt to the new environment before undertaking any major strategic changes. Rivals can seize an opportunity during the transition period of the announcing company because they remain fully operational. They can thus actively exploit the relative inability of turnover companies to react by, for example, launching sales initiatives or increasing M&A activity. This interpretation is supported by internal and external evidence. Investors on average also recognize this situation, and stock prices react accordingly. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1002/smj.3234 |
format | Article |
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This study analyzes whether and how the disruption of top management turnovers can affect not only turnover firms but also their intra‐industry rivals. It thus adds to the literature on both leader life cycles and competitive dynamics. Using a U.S. sample of 857 CEO turnovers, we find a period of relative stagnation for announcing companies following top management turnovers. We also find that intra‐industry rivals can use this period to their advantage. Semi‐structured interviews with seasoned CEOs, CFOs, and a board member from large publicly listed firms, as well as an extensive news search, support this notion. Intra‐industry rivals gain a competitive advantage that can result in positive abnormal stock returns and accounting performance. The intra‐industry outperformance is greater for forced turnovers.
Managerial summary
The departure of a company's CEO, forced or not, is usually a disruptive event for a company, as the successor must adapt to the new environment before undertaking any major strategic changes. Rivals can seize an opportunity during the transition period of the announcing company because they remain fully operational. They can thus actively exploit the relative inability of turnover companies to react by, for example, launching sales initiatives or increasing M&A activity. This interpretation is supported by internal and external evidence. Investors on average also recognize this situation, and stock prices react accordingly.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0143-2095</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1097-0266</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1002/smj.3234</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd</publisher><subject>Chief executives ; Companies ; Competition ; Competitive advantage ; competitive dynamics ; Disruption ; Executive dismissals ; Good news ; information effects ; intra‐industry effects ; leader life cycle ; Life cycles ; News ; Prices ; Sales ; Stagnation ; Stock prices ; Top management ; top management turnover ; transition period</subject><ispartof>Strategic management journal, 2021-03, Vol.42 (3), p.579-607</ispartof><rights>2020 Strategic Management Society</rights><rights>2021 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3574-5afff9e8f089ff666d4c6121068302ee17e0f3a467cc988c45c301654e58e7d23</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3574-5afff9e8f089ff666d4c6121068302ee17e0f3a467cc988c45c301654e58e7d23</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002%2Fsmj.3234$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002%2Fsmj.3234$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,1411,27901,27902,45550,45551</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Burchard, Cord H.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Proelss, Juliane</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schäffer, Utz</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schweizer, Denis</creatorcontrib><title>Bad news for announcers, good news for rivals: Are rivals fully seizing transition‐period opportunities following announcers' top management turnovers?</title><title>Strategic management journal</title><description>Research summary
This study analyzes whether and how the disruption of top management turnovers can affect not only turnover firms but also their intra‐industry rivals. It thus adds to the literature on both leader life cycles and competitive dynamics. Using a U.S. sample of 857 CEO turnovers, we find a period of relative stagnation for announcing companies following top management turnovers. We also find that intra‐industry rivals can use this period to their advantage. Semi‐structured interviews with seasoned CEOs, CFOs, and a board member from large publicly listed firms, as well as an extensive news search, support this notion. Intra‐industry rivals gain a competitive advantage that can result in positive abnormal stock returns and accounting performance. The intra‐industry outperformance is greater for forced turnovers.
Managerial summary
The departure of a company's CEO, forced or not, is usually a disruptive event for a company, as the successor must adapt to the new environment before undertaking any major strategic changes. Rivals can seize an opportunity during the transition period of the announcing company because they remain fully operational. They can thus actively exploit the relative inability of turnover companies to react by, for example, launching sales initiatives or increasing M&A activity. This interpretation is supported by internal and external evidence. Investors on average also recognize this situation, and stock prices react accordingly.</description><subject>Chief executives</subject><subject>Companies</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Competitive advantage</subject><subject>competitive dynamics</subject><subject>Disruption</subject><subject>Executive dismissals</subject><subject>Good news</subject><subject>information effects</subject><subject>intra‐industry effects</subject><subject>leader life cycle</subject><subject>Life cycles</subject><subject>News</subject><subject>Prices</subject><subject>Sales</subject><subject>Stagnation</subject><subject>Stock prices</subject><subject>Top management</subject><subject>top management turnover</subject><subject>transition period</subject><issn>0143-2095</issn><issn>1097-0266</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp1kc-KFDEQxhtRcFwFHyEgqAd7zf_ueJFx8c8uKx7UcwiZSpOhJ2mT9I7jaR9hr76eT2LaWdCLp_qo-lV9BV_TPCb4lGBMX-bd9pRRxu80K4JV12Iq5d1mhQlnLcVK3G8e5LzFuEqlVs3PN2aDAuwzcjEhE0Kcg4WUX6Ahxn8myV-ZMb9C6wS3Grl5HA8og__hw4BKMiH74mP4dX0zQfJ1O05TTGUOtQ3LmXGM-4X9a_MMlTihnQlmgB2EgsqcQryqk9cPm3uu2sCj23rSfH339svZh_by0_vzs_Vla5noeCuMc05B73CvnJNSbriVhBIse4YpAOkAO2a47KxVfW-5sAwTKTiIHroNZSfNk-PdKcVvM-Sit7E-US015b3kSnC5UE-P1GBG0D7YGAp8L4OZc9Z6LQVTXFAqK_j8CNoUc07g9JT8zqSDJlgvCemakF4Sqmh7RPd-hMN_Of3548Uf_jeVmZW3</recordid><startdate>202103</startdate><enddate>202103</enddate><creator>Burchard, Cord H.</creator><creator>Proelss, Juliane</creator><creator>Schäffer, Utz</creator><creator>Schweizer, Denis</creator><general>John Wiley & Sons, Ltd</general><general>John Wiley & Sons, Inc</general><general>Wiley Periodicals Inc</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>202103</creationdate><title>Bad news for announcers, good news for rivals: Are rivals fully seizing transition‐period opportunities following announcers' top management turnovers?</title><author>Burchard, Cord H. ; Proelss, Juliane ; Schäffer, Utz ; Schweizer, Denis</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3574-5afff9e8f089ff666d4c6121068302ee17e0f3a467cc988c45c301654e58e7d23</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Chief executives</topic><topic>Companies</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Competitive advantage</topic><topic>competitive dynamics</topic><topic>Disruption</topic><topic>Executive dismissals</topic><topic>Good news</topic><topic>information effects</topic><topic>intra‐industry effects</topic><topic>leader life cycle</topic><topic>Life cycles</topic><topic>News</topic><topic>Prices</topic><topic>Sales</topic><topic>Stagnation</topic><topic>Stock prices</topic><topic>Top management</topic><topic>top management turnover</topic><topic>transition period</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Burchard, Cord H.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Proelss, Juliane</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schäffer, Utz</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schweizer, Denis</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Strategic management journal</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Burchard, Cord H.</au><au>Proelss, Juliane</au><au>Schäffer, Utz</au><au>Schweizer, Denis</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Bad news for announcers, good news for rivals: Are rivals fully seizing transition‐period opportunities following announcers' top management turnovers?</atitle><jtitle>Strategic management journal</jtitle><date>2021-03</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>42</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>579</spage><epage>607</epage><pages>579-607</pages><issn>0143-2095</issn><eissn>1097-0266</eissn><abstract>Research summary
This study analyzes whether and how the disruption of top management turnovers can affect not only turnover firms but also their intra‐industry rivals. It thus adds to the literature on both leader life cycles and competitive dynamics. Using a U.S. sample of 857 CEO turnovers, we find a period of relative stagnation for announcing companies following top management turnovers. We also find that intra‐industry rivals can use this period to their advantage. Semi‐structured interviews with seasoned CEOs, CFOs, and a board member from large publicly listed firms, as well as an extensive news search, support this notion. Intra‐industry rivals gain a competitive advantage that can result in positive abnormal stock returns and accounting performance. The intra‐industry outperformance is greater for forced turnovers.
Managerial summary
The departure of a company's CEO, forced or not, is usually a disruptive event for a company, as the successor must adapt to the new environment before undertaking any major strategic changes. Rivals can seize an opportunity during the transition period of the announcing company because they remain fully operational. They can thus actively exploit the relative inability of turnover companies to react by, for example, launching sales initiatives or increasing M&A activity. This interpretation is supported by internal and external evidence. Investors on average also recognize this situation, and stock prices react accordingly.</abstract><cop>Chichester, UK</cop><pub>John Wiley & Sons, Ltd</pub><doi>10.1002/smj.3234</doi><tpages>29</tpages></addata></record> |
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subjects | Chief executives Companies Competition Competitive advantage competitive dynamics Disruption Executive dismissals Good news information effects intra‐industry effects leader life cycle Life cycles News Prices Sales Stagnation Stock prices Top management top management turnover transition period |
title | Bad news for announcers, good news for rivals: Are rivals fully seizing transition‐period opportunities following announcers' top management turnovers? |
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