Knowledge and the Nexus Requirement in Obstruction-of-Justice Offenses

This Note analyzes conflicting trends in caselaw interpreting the nexus requirement for obstruction-of-justice offenses under United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995), and it argues that knowledge that one s actions are likely to affect an official proceeding remains an essential element of the nexus requirement. This Note is important because mainstream attention on obstruction of justice has put the offense in clear public view. But more importantly, diverging courts of appeals opinions have created confusion as to what obstruction of justice requires. The lingering circuit split on the role of knowledge in the nexus requirement creates inconsistent standards throughout the country. This result is particularly troubling because of the breadth of obstruction-of-justice offenses generally and 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) in particular. This Note works toward resolving conflicts in obstruction-of-justice law by carefully analyzing the Supreme Courts statements on obstruction of justice, tracing the application of those cases across the circuits, and arguing for a best interpretation of the nexus requirement that includes knowledge.