Response to Braham and van Hees, Sher, Vallentyne, and Laslier
I am most grateful to the five commentators for the time they spent reading and thinking about How We Cooperate: A Theory of Kantian Optimization (HwC) (Roemer 2019). They have forced me to think once more about a number of my claims. In particular, I have been ambiguous about whether Kantian optimi...
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| description | I am most grateful to the five commentators for the time they spent reading and thinking about How We Cooperate: A Theory of Kantian Optimization (HwC) (Roemer 2019). They have forced me to think once more about a number of my claims. In particular, I have been ambiguous about whether Kantian optimization is a rational approach, in some situations, or whether it is a moral one. I hope I clarify my present view below. Despite what I say here, I certainly do not believe I have had the last word on this topic. The summary of my theory of simple Kantian optimization by Braham and van Hees in section I of their contribution is admirable. They note that the theory prescribes which action to take in a game, while Kant's categorical imperative is an instruction of which maxim to apply to the choice of one's actions. I presume this is correct. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.23941/ejpe.v13i2.529 |
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| subjects | Cooperation Equilibrium Game theory Games Labeling Morality Optimization Preferences Prisoners |
| title | Response to Braham and van Hees, Sher, Vallentyne, and Laslier |
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