Political Corruption and Firm Value in the U.S.: Do Rents and Monitoring Matter?
Political corruption imposes substantial costs on shareholders in the U.S. Yet, we understand little about the basic factors that exacerbate or mitigate the value consequences of political corruption. Using federal corruption convictions data, we find that firm-level economic rents and monitoring me...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of business ethics 2021-01, Vol.168 (2), p.335-351 |
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| creator | Brown, Nerissa C. Smith, Jared D. White, Roger M. Zutter, Chad J. |
| description | Political corruption imposes substantial costs on shareholders in the U.S. Yet, we understand little about the basic factors that exacerbate or mitigate the value consequences of political corruption. Using federal corruption convictions data, we find that firm-level economic rents and monitoring mechanisms moderate the negative relation between corruption and firm value. The value consequences of political corruption are exacerbated for firms operating in low-rent product markets and mitigated for firms subject to external monitoring by state governments or monitoring induced by disclosure transparency. Our results should inform managers and policymakers of the tradeoffs imposed on firms operating in politically corrupt districts. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10551-019-04181-0 |
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| source | PAIS Index; Business Source Complete; Education Source; Springer Nature - Complete Springer Journals |
| subjects | Business and Management Business Ethics Companies Corruption Corruption in government Districts Education Ethics Management Markets Original Paper Philosophy Policy making Quality of Life Research Rents Stockholders Transparency Value |
| title | Political Corruption and Firm Value in the U.S.: Do Rents and Monitoring Matter? |
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