Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction

The "generalized second-price auction" is widely employed to sell internet advertising positions and has many equilibria. Analysis of this auction has assumed that myopic players commonly know each others' position values, and that the resulting equilibrium play is "locally envy-...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic theory 2021-02, Vol.71 (1), p.235-250
1. Verfasser:	Norman, Thomas W. L.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Advertising Auctions Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Envy Equilibrium Game Theory Internet/Web advertising Microeconomics Public Finance Research Article Social and Behav. Sciences
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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