Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games

We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence -- the order in which players update their actions -- is essentially irrelevant in determining whether the dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium in certain class...

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Veröffentlicht in:	arXiv.org 2022-11
Hauptverfasser:	Heinrich, Torsten, Jang, Yoojin, Mungo, Luca, Pangallo, Marco, Scott, Alex, Tarbush, Bassel, Wiese, Samuel
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Clockwork Convergence Game theory Games Learning Players Sequences
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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