Prejudice, bias and identity neutral policy

How does identity blind hiring, as opposed to sighted hiring, influence matching between high ability candidates and high value jobs? Job seekers might face constraints in signaling their abilities for lack of wealth and being denied education. Adding to this problem are the prejudices and biases of...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Social choice and welfare 2021-01, Vol.56 (1), p.173-203
Hauptverfasser:	Bag, Parimal K., Saha, Bibhas, Sikdar, Shiva
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Ability Applicants Bias Candidates Disadvantaged Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Employers Ethnische Diskriminierung Game Theory Hiring Identity International Political Economy Job applicants Job hunting Original Paper Personalauswahl Prejudice Productivity Public Finance Social and Behav. Sciences Social Policy Systematischer Fehler Unemployed people Unemployment Vacancies Wealth
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