An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement
The existing literature holds that favoritism in public procurement is due to discrimination or corruption. In procurement, the government agency faces a tradeoff between the expected allocative efficiency and the expected rent paid to the contracting firm. When the government agency's efficien...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Manchester school 2021-01, Vol.89 (1), p.128-137 |
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| container_title | The Manchester school |
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| creator | Pi, Jiancai |
| description | The existing literature holds that favoritism in public procurement is due to discrimination or corruption. In procurement, the government agency faces a tradeoff between the expected allocative efficiency and the expected rent paid to the contracting firm. When the government agency's efficiency gain is larger (resp. smaller) than its rent loss, it is optimal for the government agency to choose the contract with the low‐cost (resp. high‐cost) firm. The general public usually deems that the latter case implies that there exists favoritism in public procurement. We point out that such seeming favoritism is not favoritism in the true sense. There may be an over‐identification of favoritism in public procurement in the existing literature. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/manc.12353 |
| format | Article |
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There may be an over‐identification of favoritism in public procurement in the existing literature.</description><subject>Allocative efficiency</subject><subject>Bias</subject><subject>Corruption</subject><subject>Discrimination</subject><subject>favoritism</subject><subject>Government agencies</subject><subject>Government purchasing</subject><subject>limited liability</subject><subject>moral hazard</subject><subject>public procurement</subject><subject>Purchasing</subject><issn>1463-6786</issn><issn>1467-9957</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kM1KAzEUhYMoWKsbn2DAnTA1v5ME3JRiVai60XVIM0lJmcnUZKbStzftuPZu7l1895zDAeAWwRnK89DqYGYIE0bOwATRipdSMn5-uklZcVFdgquUthBCXlV4Ah7nofBhb1PvN7r3XSg6VyRrWx82hdP7LvrepzYzxW5YN94Uu9iZIdrWhv4aXDjdJHvzt6fga_n0uXgpVx_Pr4v5qjSEUFJiaSAVFlIp6lrUyFlbUy4oNNphJpDAGvJaIqcdkVBSh9fEYFYZh42x0pApuBt1s_f3kLOqbTfEkC0VpjxLMMZ4pu5HysQupWid2kXf6nhQCKpjO-rYjjq1k2E0wj--sYd_SPU2f1-MP78PD2c9</recordid><startdate>202101</startdate><enddate>202101</enddate><creator>Pi, Jiancai</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4327-8355</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>202101</creationdate><title>An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement</title><author>Pi, Jiancai</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3343-29c048e0498dd8d1feed47840caf258182a07d91faf39094f2b3c256cf2cce9c3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Allocative efficiency</topic><topic>Bias</topic><topic>Corruption</topic><topic>Discrimination</topic><topic>favoritism</topic><topic>Government agencies</topic><topic>Government purchasing</topic><topic>limited liability</topic><topic>moral hazard</topic><topic>public procurement</topic><topic>Purchasing</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Pi, Jiancai</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Manchester school</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Pi, Jiancai</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement</atitle><jtitle>The Manchester school</jtitle><date>2021-01</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>89</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>128</spage><epage>137</epage><pages>128-137</pages><issn>1463-6786</issn><eissn>1467-9957</eissn><abstract>The existing literature holds that favoritism in public procurement is due to discrimination or corruption. 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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1463-6786 |
| ispartof | The Manchester school, 2021-01, Vol.89 (1), p.128-137 |
| issn | 1463-6786 1467-9957 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2472585557 |
| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Access via Wiley Online Library |
| subjects | Allocative efficiency Bias Corruption Discrimination favoritism Government agencies Government purchasing limited liability moral hazard public procurement Purchasing |
| title | An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement |
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