Positional Information and the Measurement of Specificity

Philosophical discussions of information and specificity in biology are now commonplace, but no consensus exists about whether the privileging of genetic causation in investigation and explanation is justified. However, little effort has been expended on understanding practices when scientists exper...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Philosophy of science 2020-12, Vol.87 (5), p.1061-1072
1. Verfasser: Love, Alan C.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 1072
container_issue 5
container_start_page 1061
container_title Philosophy of science
container_volume 87
creator Love, Alan C.
description Philosophical discussions of information and specificity in biology are now commonplace, but no consensus exists about whether the privileging of genetic causation in investigation and explanation is justified. However, little effort has been expended on understanding practices when scientists experimentally measure information or causal specificity. An example of this type of practice—measuring positional information in gene expression during pattern formation in embryogenesis—shows that biologists are unconcerned with comparing the amount of information in genes with that of other factors. Instead, they focus on whether the measured causal specificity explains the phenomenon under scrutiny.
doi_str_mv 10.1086/710617
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2470546184</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2470546184</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c243t-9c7933ffb6f1ead384cd86a11e3b5a3153786e2a3ec47d7af02e3630781aad9e3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpF0F9LwzAUBfAgCs6pn6Gg-FbNbbIkfZThP5goqOBbuUtvXMbW1KR92Le3owOfLhd-HA6HsUvgt8CNutPAFegjNoGZKHOt9Pcxm3AuIDeFNKfsLKU15wCGmwkr30PynQ8NbrKXxoW4xf2XYVNn3YqyV8LUR9pS02XBZR8tWe-89d3unJ043CS6ONwp-3p8-Jw_54u3p5f5_SK3hRRdXlpdCuHcUjkgrIWRtjYKAUgsZyiGjtooKlCQlbrW6HhBQgmuDSDWJYkpuxpz2xh-e0pdtQ59HPqmqpCaz6QCIwd1MyobQ0qRXNVGv8W4q4BX-1mqcZYBXo-wtytv8Se0kVL6zzywP-MbYDY</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2470546184</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Positional Information and the Measurement of Specificity</title><source>Cambridge Journals</source><creator>Love, Alan C.</creator><creatorcontrib>Love, Alan C.</creatorcontrib><description>Philosophical discussions of information and specificity in biology are now commonplace, but no consensus exists about whether the privileging of genetic causation in investigation and explanation is justified. However, little effort has been expended on understanding practices when scientists experimentally measure information or causal specificity. An example of this type of practice—measuring positional information in gene expression during pattern formation in embryogenesis—shows that biologists are unconcerned with comparing the amount of information in genes with that of other factors. Instead, they focus on whether the measured causal specificity explains the phenomenon under scrutiny.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0031-8248</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1539-767X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1086/710617</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cambridge: The University of Chicago Press</publisher><subject>Biologists ; Biology ; Causality ; Causation ; Embryogenesis ; Embryonic growth stage ; Gene expression ; Genes ; Measurement ; Pattern formation ; Scrutiny</subject><ispartof>Philosophy of science, 2020-12, Vol.87 (5), p.1061-1072</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2020 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.</rights><rights>Copyright University of Chicago, acting through its Press Dec 2020</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c243t-9c7933ffb6f1ead384cd86a11e3b5a3153786e2a3ec47d7af02e3630781aad9e3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,27903,27904</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Love, Alan C.</creatorcontrib><title>Positional Information and the Measurement of Specificity</title><title>Philosophy of science</title><description>Philosophical discussions of information and specificity in biology are now commonplace, but no consensus exists about whether the privileging of genetic causation in investigation and explanation is justified. However, little effort has been expended on understanding practices when scientists experimentally measure information or causal specificity. An example of this type of practice—measuring positional information in gene expression during pattern formation in embryogenesis—shows that biologists are unconcerned with comparing the amount of information in genes with that of other factors. Instead, they focus on whether the measured causal specificity explains the phenomenon under scrutiny.</description><subject>Biologists</subject><subject>Biology</subject><subject>Causality</subject><subject>Causation</subject><subject>Embryogenesis</subject><subject>Embryonic growth stage</subject><subject>Gene expression</subject><subject>Genes</subject><subject>Measurement</subject><subject>Pattern formation</subject><subject>Scrutiny</subject><issn>0031-8248</issn><issn>1539-767X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpF0F9LwzAUBfAgCs6pn6Gg-FbNbbIkfZThP5goqOBbuUtvXMbW1KR92Le3owOfLhd-HA6HsUvgt8CNutPAFegjNoGZKHOt9Pcxm3AuIDeFNKfsLKU15wCGmwkr30PynQ8NbrKXxoW4xf2XYVNn3YqyV8LUR9pS02XBZR8tWe-89d3unJ043CS6ONwp-3p8-Jw_54u3p5f5_SK3hRRdXlpdCuHcUjkgrIWRtjYKAUgsZyiGjtooKlCQlbrW6HhBQgmuDSDWJYkpuxpz2xh-e0pdtQ59HPqmqpCaz6QCIwd1MyobQ0qRXNVGv8W4q4BX-1mqcZYBXo-wtytv8Se0kVL6zzywP-MbYDY</recordid><startdate>20201201</startdate><enddate>20201201</enddate><creator>Love, Alan C.</creator><general>The University of Chicago Press</general><general>Cambridge University Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20201201</creationdate><title>Positional Information and the Measurement of Specificity</title><author>Love, Alan C.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c243t-9c7933ffb6f1ead384cd86a11e3b5a3153786e2a3ec47d7af02e3630781aad9e3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Biologists</topic><topic>Biology</topic><topic>Causality</topic><topic>Causation</topic><topic>Embryogenesis</topic><topic>Embryonic growth stage</topic><topic>Gene expression</topic><topic>Genes</topic><topic>Measurement</topic><topic>Pattern formation</topic><topic>Scrutiny</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Love, Alan C.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Philosophy of science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Love, Alan C.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Positional Information and the Measurement of Specificity</atitle><jtitle>Philosophy of science</jtitle><date>2020-12-01</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>87</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>1061</spage><epage>1072</epage><pages>1061-1072</pages><issn>0031-8248</issn><eissn>1539-767X</eissn><abstract>Philosophical discussions of information and specificity in biology are now commonplace, but no consensus exists about whether the privileging of genetic causation in investigation and explanation is justified. However, little effort has been expended on understanding practices when scientists experimentally measure information or causal specificity. An example of this type of practice—measuring positional information in gene expression during pattern formation in embryogenesis—shows that biologists are unconcerned with comparing the amount of information in genes with that of other factors. Instead, they focus on whether the measured causal specificity explains the phenomenon under scrutiny.</abstract><cop>Cambridge</cop><pub>The University of Chicago Press</pub><doi>10.1086/710617</doi><tpages>12</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0031-8248
ispartof Philosophy of science, 2020-12, Vol.87 (5), p.1061-1072
issn 0031-8248
1539-767X
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_2470546184
source Cambridge Journals
subjects Biologists
Biology
Causality
Causation
Embryogenesis
Embryonic growth stage
Gene expression
Genes
Measurement
Pattern formation
Scrutiny
title Positional Information and the Measurement of Specificity
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-25T08%3A34%3A44IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Positional%20Information%20and%20the%20Measurement%20of%20Specificity&rft.jtitle=Philosophy%20of%20science&rft.au=Love,%20Alan%20C.&rft.date=2020-12-01&rft.volume=87&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=1061&rft.epage=1072&rft.pages=1061-1072&rft.issn=0031-8248&rft.eissn=1539-767X&rft_id=info:doi/10.1086/710617&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2470546184%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2470546184&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true