Presidential Elections in Russia: Opportunities and Limitations of Electoral Consolidation
This article analyzes the processes of electoral consolidation around incumbents, as well as around opposition candidates, in Russian presidential elections. On the basis of a comparative analysis of the parliamentary and presidential campaigns over six electoral cycles, the author identifies shifts...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Russian politics and law 2018-11, Vol.56 (3-6), p.262-292 |
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description | This article analyzes the processes of electoral consolidation around incumbents, as well as around opposition candidates, in Russian presidential elections. On the basis of a comparative analysis of the parliamentary and presidential campaigns over six electoral cycles, the author identifies shifts in the turnout and voting patterns for candidates in presidential elections in comparison to the previous State Duma elections. His research shows that almost all viable candidates in presidential elections rely on the electorate of a certain party-usually the one that nominates the candidate (the only important exception to this rule was the vote for P. Grudinin in the 2018 election). The study also shows that an increase in turnout in presidential elections plays into the hands of the incumbent (except for B. Yeltsin in 1996), although in some cases it can boost support for a strong opposition candidate (G. Zyuganov in 1996) or an entirely new candidate (M. Prokhorov in 2012). Having compared voting patterns between parliamentary and presidential elections, the author comes to the conclusion that an incumbent is usually able to win over ambivalent voters and, depending on the political context, voters from various party clusters; for example, supporters of A Just Russia, LDPR, liberal parties, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (at the level of certain regions). Opposition candidates possess much more limited opportunities for this kind of consolidation or lack them altogether. The author interprets these trends as a manifestation of strategic voting based on voters' rational choice in favor of the incumbent. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1080/10611940.2019.1784629 |
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On the basis of a comparative analysis of the parliamentary and presidential campaigns over six electoral cycles, the author identifies shifts in the turnout and voting patterns for candidates in presidential elections in comparison to the previous State Duma elections. His research shows that almost all viable candidates in presidential elections rely on the electorate of a certain party-usually the one that nominates the candidate (the only important exception to this rule was the vote for P. Grudinin in the 2018 election). The study also shows that an increase in turnout in presidential elections plays into the hands of the incumbent (except for B. Yeltsin in 1996), although in some cases it can boost support for a strong opposition candidate (G. Zyuganov in 1996) or an entirely new candidate (M. Prokhorov in 2012). Having compared voting patterns between parliamentary and presidential elections, the author comes to the conclusion that an incumbent is usually able to win over ambivalent voters and, depending on the political context, voters from various party clusters; for example, supporters of A Just Russia, LDPR, liberal parties, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (at the level of certain regions). Opposition candidates possess much more limited opportunities for this kind of consolidation or lack them altogether. 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Having compared voting patterns between parliamentary and presidential elections, the author comes to the conclusion that an incumbent is usually able to win over ambivalent voters and, depending on the political context, voters from various party clusters; for example, supporters of A Just Russia, LDPR, liberal parties, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (at the level of certain regions). Opposition candidates possess much more limited opportunities for this kind of consolidation or lack them altogether. The author interprets these trends as a manifestation of strategic voting based on voters' rational choice in favor of the incumbent.</description><subject>Communist parties</subject><subject>Comparative analysis</subject><subject>Political campaigns</subject><subject>Presidential candidates</subject><subject>Presidential elections</subject><subject>Rational choice</subject><subject>Strategic voting</subject><subject>Voter behavior</subject><subject>Voter turnout</subject><subject>Voting rules</subject><issn>1061-1940</issn><issn>1558-0962</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE9LAzEQxYMoWKsfQVjwvDWTTbKJJ6XUP1CoiF68hDSbQMp2U5NdpN_e1K1XT_OY-b2Z4SF0DXgGWOBbwBxAUjwjGOQMakE5kSdoAoyJEktOTrPOTHmAztFFShuMgQDnE_T5Gm3yje16r9ti0VrT-9ClwnfF25CS13fFarcLsR8633ubCt01xdJvfa9HMLjRFWL2z3MntL75nV2iM6fbZK-OdYo-Hhfv8-dyuXp6mT8sSwMVsLKuKOf5GevA0bUxonFEsLWhtJY1xbrmzjlZCzCyAUFYFrqyBq8tcYIyV03Rzbh3F8PXYFOvNmGIXT6pCOWikkJglik2UiaGlKJ1ahf9Vse9AqwOMaq_GNUhRnWMMfvuR5_vXIhb_R1i26he79sQXdSd8UlV_6_4AQLwefA</recordid><startdate>20181102</startdate><enddate>20181102</enddate><creator>Turovsky, Rostislav F.</creator><general>Routledge</general><general>Taylor & Francis Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20181102</creationdate><title>Presidential Elections in Russia: Opportunities and Limitations of Electoral Consolidation</title><author>Turovsky, Rostislav F.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c1315-73466216ef1f4bcc8df285bc4479740a76fff9781c9d182581ca3ec0be2f845f3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><topic>Communist parties</topic><topic>Comparative analysis</topic><topic>Political campaigns</topic><topic>Presidential candidates</topic><topic>Presidential elections</topic><topic>Rational choice</topic><topic>Strategic voting</topic><topic>Voter behavior</topic><topic>Voter turnout</topic><topic>Voting rules</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Turovsky, Rostislav F.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><jtitle>Russian politics and law</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Turovsky, Rostislav F.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Presidential Elections in Russia: Opportunities and Limitations of Electoral Consolidation</atitle><jtitle>Russian politics and law</jtitle><date>2018-11-02</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>56</volume><issue>3-6</issue><spage>262</spage><epage>292</epage><pages>262-292</pages><issn>1061-1940</issn><eissn>1558-0962</eissn><abstract>This article analyzes the processes of electoral consolidation around incumbents, as well as around opposition candidates, in Russian presidential elections. On the basis of a comparative analysis of the parliamentary and presidential campaigns over six electoral cycles, the author identifies shifts in the turnout and voting patterns for candidates in presidential elections in comparison to the previous State Duma elections. His research shows that almost all viable candidates in presidential elections rely on the electorate of a certain party-usually the one that nominates the candidate (the only important exception to this rule was the vote for P. Grudinin in the 2018 election). The study also shows that an increase in turnout in presidential elections plays into the hands of the incumbent (except for B. Yeltsin in 1996), although in some cases it can boost support for a strong opposition candidate (G. Zyuganov in 1996) or an entirely new candidate (M. Prokhorov in 2012). Having compared voting patterns between parliamentary and presidential elections, the author comes to the conclusion that an incumbent is usually able to win over ambivalent voters and, depending on the political context, voters from various party clusters; for example, supporters of A Just Russia, LDPR, liberal parties, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (at the level of certain regions). Opposition candidates possess much more limited opportunities for this kind of consolidation or lack them altogether. The author interprets these trends as a manifestation of strategic voting based on voters' rational choice in favor of the incumbent.</abstract><cop>Abingdon</cop><pub>Routledge</pub><doi>10.1080/10611940.2019.1784629</doi><tpages>31</tpages></addata></record> |
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source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; HeinOnline Law Journal Library; Political Science Complete (EBSCOhost) |
subjects | Communist parties Comparative analysis Political campaigns Presidential candidates Presidential elections Rational choice Strategic voting Voter behavior Voter turnout Voting rules |
title | Presidential Elections in Russia: Opportunities and Limitations of Electoral Consolidation |
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