Using the MSET Device to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
One pivotal countermeasure in dealing with side-channel power analysis attacks is to maintain the signal-to-noise ratio of the power readings associated with the target as data-independent and as low as possible, in order to limit the attacker's ability to deduce meaningful information from the...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | IEEE journal of the Electron Devices Society 2020, Vol.8, p.1328-1334 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 1334 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | |
| container_start_page | 1328 |
| container_title | IEEE journal of the Electron Devices Society |
| container_volume | 8 |
| creator | Peled, Assaf David, Liron Amrani, Ofer Rosenwaks, Yossi Wool, Avishai |
| description | One pivotal countermeasure in dealing with side-channel power analysis attacks is to maintain the signal-to-noise ratio of the power readings associated with the target as data-independent and as low as possible, in order to limit the attacker's ability to deduce meaningful information from the target. The following study shows that the MSET (Multiple-State Electrostatically-Formed Nanowire Transistor) device achieves these two desired outcomes by virtue of its low-power characteristics, therefore having an inherent advantage in terms of side channel attacks over prevalent technologies. This advantage is tested with an SRAM cell and a memory register. Using correlation metrics, the correlation coefficient of the Hamming distance to the power dissipation in the register - at the adversary's point of observation - is shown to be close to zero over multiple power traces, when the register is implemented in MSET technology. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/JEDS.2020.3032635 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_doaj_</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2460158840</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>9233387</ieee_id><doaj_id>oai_doaj_org_article_9c6053a84b254dc09b0ea3ff77aad54f</doaj_id><sourcerecordid>2460158840</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c402t-103d6e7d0cfbceb0a7c3d155415fbe8b7634f7b16619f6db1021269d57f885ad3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpNkFtLAzEQhRdRUGp_gPiy4PPWyT3rW2nrjYpC9Tlkc6lba1OTVPHfu7VSnJcZhnPOMF9RnCEYIAT15f1kPBtgwDAgQDAn7KA4wYjLigtCD__Nx0U_pQV0JRGvOT8prl5Su5qX-dWVD7PJczl2n61xZQ7lKGxW2UVtcvkUvlyshiu9_E5tKoc5a_OWTosjr5fJ9f96r3i5njyPbqvp483daDitDAWcKwTEcicsGN8Y14AWhljEGEXMN042ghPqRYM4R7XntkGAEea1ZcJLybQlveJul2uDXqh1bN91_FZBt-p3EeJc6Zhbs3SqNhwY0ZI2mFFroG7AaeK9EFpbRn2XdbHLWsfwsXEpq0XYxO6xpDDlgJiUFDoV2qlMDClF5_dXEagtcbUlrrbE1R_xznO-87TOub2-xoQQKcgPomh6Lg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Website</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2460158840</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Using the MSET Device to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks</title><source>IEEE Open Access Journals</source><source>DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals</source><source>Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals</source><creator>Peled, Assaf ; David, Liron ; Amrani, Ofer ; Rosenwaks, Yossi ; Wool, Avishai</creator><creatorcontrib>Peled, Assaf ; David, Liron ; Amrani, Ofer ; Rosenwaks, Yossi ; Wool, Avishai</creatorcontrib><description>One pivotal countermeasure in dealing with side-channel power analysis attacks is to maintain the signal-to-noise ratio of the power readings associated with the target as data-independent and as low as possible, in order to limit the attacker's ability to deduce meaningful information from the target. The following study shows that the MSET (Multiple-State Electrostatically-Formed Nanowire Transistor) device achieves these two desired outcomes by virtue of its low-power characteristics, therefore having an inherent advantage in terms of side channel attacks over prevalent technologies. This advantage is tested with an SRAM cell and a memory register. Using correlation metrics, the correlation coefficient of the Hamming distance to the power dissipation in the register - at the adversary's point of observation - is shown to be close to zero over multiple power traces, when the register is implemented in MSET technology.</description><identifier>ISSN: 2168-6734</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2168-6734</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/JEDS.2020.3032635</identifier><identifier>CODEN: IJEDAC</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: IEEE</publisher><subject>Correlation coefficients ; Logic gates ; low-power transistors ; MOSFET ; MSET ; Nanowires ; Power demand ; Power management ; power-analysis attacks ; Resistors ; side-channel attacks ; Signal to noise ratio ; Silicon-on-insulator ; Static random access memory ; Transistors</subject><ispartof>IEEE journal of the Electron Devices Society, 2020, Vol.8, p.1328-1334</ispartof><rights>Copyright The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) 2020</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c402t-103d6e7d0cfbceb0a7c3d155415fbe8b7634f7b16619f6db1021269d57f885ad3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c402t-103d6e7d0cfbceb0a7c3d155415fbe8b7634f7b16619f6db1021269d57f885ad3</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-3144-8994 ; 0000-0001-6502-3017 ; 0000-0002-8371-4759</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9233387$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,864,2102,4024,27633,27923,27924,27925,54933</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Peled, Assaf</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>David, Liron</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Amrani, Ofer</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rosenwaks, Yossi</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wool, Avishai</creatorcontrib><title>Using the MSET Device to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks</title><title>IEEE journal of the Electron Devices Society</title><addtitle>JEDS</addtitle><description>One pivotal countermeasure in dealing with side-channel power analysis attacks is to maintain the signal-to-noise ratio of the power readings associated with the target as data-independent and as low as possible, in order to limit the attacker's ability to deduce meaningful information from the target. The following study shows that the MSET (Multiple-State Electrostatically-Formed Nanowire Transistor) device achieves these two desired outcomes by virtue of its low-power characteristics, therefore having an inherent advantage in terms of side channel attacks over prevalent technologies. This advantage is tested with an SRAM cell and a memory register. Using correlation metrics, the correlation coefficient of the Hamming distance to the power dissipation in the register - at the adversary's point of observation - is shown to be close to zero over multiple power traces, when the register is implemented in MSET technology.</description><subject>Correlation coefficients</subject><subject>Logic gates</subject><subject>low-power transistors</subject><subject>MOSFET</subject><subject>MSET</subject><subject>Nanowires</subject><subject>Power demand</subject><subject>Power management</subject><subject>power-analysis attacks</subject><subject>Resistors</subject><subject>side-channel attacks</subject><subject>Signal to noise ratio</subject><subject>Silicon-on-insulator</subject><subject>Static random access memory</subject><subject>Transistors</subject><issn>2168-6734</issn><issn>2168-6734</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>ESBDL</sourceid><sourceid>RIE</sourceid><sourceid>DOA</sourceid><recordid>eNpNkFtLAzEQhRdRUGp_gPiy4PPWyT3rW2nrjYpC9Tlkc6lba1OTVPHfu7VSnJcZhnPOMF9RnCEYIAT15f1kPBtgwDAgQDAn7KA4wYjLigtCD__Nx0U_pQV0JRGvOT8prl5Su5qX-dWVD7PJczl2n61xZQ7lKGxW2UVtcvkUvlyshiu9_E5tKoc5a_OWTosjr5fJ9f96r3i5njyPbqvp483daDitDAWcKwTEcicsGN8Y14AWhljEGEXMN042ghPqRYM4R7XntkGAEea1ZcJLybQlveJul2uDXqh1bN91_FZBt-p3EeJc6Zhbs3SqNhwY0ZI2mFFroG7AaeK9EFpbRn2XdbHLWsfwsXEpq0XYxO6xpDDlgJiUFDoV2qlMDClF5_dXEagtcbUlrrbE1R_xznO-87TOub2-xoQQKcgPomh6Lg</recordid><startdate>2020</startdate><enddate>2020</enddate><creator>Peled, Assaf</creator><creator>David, Liron</creator><creator>Amrani, Ofer</creator><creator>Rosenwaks, Yossi</creator><creator>Wool, Avishai</creator><general>IEEE</general><general>The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)</general><scope>97E</scope><scope>ESBDL</scope><scope>RIA</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7SP</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>L7M</scope><scope>DOA</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3144-8994</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6502-3017</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8371-4759</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>2020</creationdate><title>Using the MSET Device to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks</title><author>Peled, Assaf ; David, Liron ; Amrani, Ofer ; Rosenwaks, Yossi ; Wool, Avishai</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c402t-103d6e7d0cfbceb0a7c3d155415fbe8b7634f7b16619f6db1021269d57f885ad3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Correlation coefficients</topic><topic>Logic gates</topic><topic>low-power transistors</topic><topic>MOSFET</topic><topic>MSET</topic><topic>Nanowires</topic><topic>Power demand</topic><topic>Power management</topic><topic>power-analysis attacks</topic><topic>Resistors</topic><topic>side-channel attacks</topic><topic>Signal to noise ratio</topic><topic>Silicon-on-insulator</topic><topic>Static random access memory</topic><topic>Transistors</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Peled, Assaf</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>David, Liron</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Amrani, Ofer</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rosenwaks, Yossi</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wool, Avishai</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 2005-present</collection><collection>IEEE Open Access Journals</collection><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 1998-Present</collection><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Electronics & Communications Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><collection>DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals</collection><jtitle>IEEE journal of the Electron Devices Society</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Peled, Assaf</au><au>David, Liron</au><au>Amrani, Ofer</au><au>Rosenwaks, Yossi</au><au>Wool, Avishai</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Using the MSET Device to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks</atitle><jtitle>IEEE journal of the Electron Devices Society</jtitle><stitle>JEDS</stitle><date>2020</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>8</volume><spage>1328</spage><epage>1334</epage><pages>1328-1334</pages><issn>2168-6734</issn><eissn>2168-6734</eissn><coden>IJEDAC</coden><abstract>One pivotal countermeasure in dealing with side-channel power analysis attacks is to maintain the signal-to-noise ratio of the power readings associated with the target as data-independent and as low as possible, in order to limit the attacker's ability to deduce meaningful information from the target. The following study shows that the MSET (Multiple-State Electrostatically-Formed Nanowire Transistor) device achieves these two desired outcomes by virtue of its low-power characteristics, therefore having an inherent advantage in terms of side channel attacks over prevalent technologies. This advantage is tested with an SRAM cell and a memory register. Using correlation metrics, the correlation coefficient of the Hamming distance to the power dissipation in the register - at the adversary's point of observation - is shown to be close to zero over multiple power traces, when the register is implemented in MSET technology.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/JEDS.2020.3032635</doi><tpages>7</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3144-8994</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6502-3017</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8371-4759</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 2168-6734 |
| ispartof | IEEE journal of the Electron Devices Society, 2020, Vol.8, p.1328-1334 |
| issn | 2168-6734 2168-6734 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2460158840 |
| source | IEEE Open Access Journals; DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals; Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals |
| subjects | Correlation coefficients Logic gates low-power transistors MOSFET MSET Nanowires Power demand Power management power-analysis attacks Resistors side-channel attacks Signal to noise ratio Silicon-on-insulator Static random access memory Transistors |
| title | Using the MSET Device to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-04T17%3A24%3A37IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_doaj_&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Using%20the%20MSET%20Device%20to%20Counteract%20Power-Analysis%20Attacks&rft.jtitle=IEEE%20journal%20of%20the%20Electron%20Devices%20Society&rft.au=Peled,%20Assaf&rft.date=2020&rft.volume=8&rft.spage=1328&rft.epage=1334&rft.pages=1328-1334&rft.issn=2168-6734&rft.eissn=2168-6734&rft.coden=IJEDAC&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/JEDS.2020.3032635&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_doaj_%3E2460158840%3C/proquest_doaj_%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2460158840&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=9233387&rft_doaj_id=oai_doaj_org_article_9c6053a84b254dc09b0ea3ff77aad54f&rfr_iscdi=true |