Empirical Analysis of MAVLink Protocol Vulnerability for Attacking Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or the so-called drones, have been used in various applications. In particular, UAVs are used for rescue systems, disaster detection, and military purposes, as well as for leisure and commercial purposes. UAVs that are controlled over networks by ground con...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | IEEE access 2018-01, Vol.6, p.43203-43212 |
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| creator | Kwon, Young-Min Yu, Jaemin Cho, Byeong-Moon Eun, Yongsoon Park, Kyung-Joon |
| description | Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or the so-called drones, have been used in various applications. In particular, UAVs are used for rescue systems, disaster detection, and military purposes, as well as for leisure and commercial purposes. UAVs that are controlled over networks by ground control stations (GCS) can provide various services with expanded activity area. It is thus of critical importance to investigate the vulnerability of the drone system. In this paper, we focus on UAVs controlled by GCS over networks. We analyze the vulnerability of the micro-air-vehicle communication (MAVLink) protocol, which is one of the most widely adopted communication protocols for GCS-based control of UAVs. Then, by exploiting the vulnerability of the MAVLink protocol, we propose an attack methodology that can disable an ongoing mission of a UAV. Our empirical study confirms that the proposed attack can stop the attacked UAV and disable the mission. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2863237 |
| format | Article |
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(IEEE) 2018</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-f444bb2ee6ec74b4a14d6dccb3d32cb1582cb0e61a542657ad6a3f67380447f83</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-f444bb2ee6ec74b4a14d6dccb3d32cb1582cb0e61a542657ad6a3f67380447f83</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-1495-2163 ; 0000-0003-4807-6461</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8425627$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,860,2096,27610,27901,27902,54908</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Kwon, Young-Min</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yu, Jaemin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cho, Byeong-Moon</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Eun, Yongsoon</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Park, Kyung-Joon</creatorcontrib><title>Empirical Analysis of MAVLink Protocol Vulnerability for Attacking Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</title><title>IEEE access</title><addtitle>Access</addtitle><description>Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or the so-called drones, have been used in various applications. 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| source | IEEE Open Access Journals; DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals; Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals |
| subjects | Cryptography DoS Drone aircraft Drone vehicles Drones Eavesdropping Empirical analysis flooding attack Ground stations MAVLink network attack packet injection Payloads Protocol Protocols Sensors UAS UAV Unmanned aerial vehicles Vehicles |
| title | Empirical Analysis of MAVLink Protocol Vulnerability for Attacking Unmanned Aerial Vehicles |
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