The Law Pandemics and Presidential Power: A Taxonomy

Presidential power in a pandemic, as in other domestic crises, is largely a function of congressional delegation. A variety of statutes grant the president broad authority in times of emergency, including power over industrial production and quarantine power during outbreaks of communicable disease....

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Veröffentlicht in:Presidential studies quarterly 2020-09, Vol.50 (3), p.690-715
Hauptverfasser: Rudalevige, Andrew, Yu, Victoria E.
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description Presidential power in a pandemic, as in other domestic crises, is largely a function of congressional delegation. A variety of statutes grant the president broad authority in times of emergency, including power over industrial production and quarantine power during outbreaks of communicable disease. Wide administrative discretion is spread across the U.S. Code more generally and may be implemented via executive order, regulations, or guidance documents. But while these powers may appear broad, they are hardly “total,” as President Donald Trump has asserted, and the president’s ability (or willingness) to use them is bounded by federalism, the potential constraints of legislative pushback, and political considerations.
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source Wiley Online Library; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; HeinOnline Law Journal Library database
subjects Classification
coronavirus
COVID
Defense Production Act
Delegation
emergency powers
Executive orders
Federalism
Industrial production
Infectious diseases
Insurrection Act
National Emergencies Act
Pandemics
Political power
Power
Presidential powers
presidents
public health
Public Health Service Act
Quarantine
Regulation
regulations
Statutes
title The Law Pandemics and Presidential Power: A Taxonomy
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