The Law Pandemics and Presidential Power: A Taxonomy
Presidential power in a pandemic, as in other domestic crises, is largely a function of congressional delegation. A variety of statutes grant the president broad authority in times of emergency, including power over industrial production and quarantine power during outbreaks of communicable disease....
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Presidential studies quarterly 2020-09, Vol.50 (3), p.690-715 |
---|---|
Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | 715 |
---|---|
container_issue | 3 |
container_start_page | 690 |
container_title | Presidential studies quarterly |
container_volume | 50 |
creator | Rudalevige, Andrew Yu, Victoria E. |
description | Presidential power in a pandemic, as in other domestic crises, is largely a function of congressional delegation. A variety of statutes grant the president broad authority in times of emergency, including power over industrial production and quarantine power during outbreaks of communicable disease. Wide administrative discretion is spread across the U.S. Code more generally and may be implemented via executive order, regulations, or guidance documents. But while these powers may appear broad, they are hardly “total,” as President Donald Trump has asserted, and the president’s ability (or willingness) to use them is bounded by federalism, the potential constraints of legislative pushback, and political considerations. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/psq.12673 |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2450719179</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2450719179</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2973-485b7df8cd1f315b4cd05e241c3160736644b7454289276f745a84c50fec9e2e3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp1kE1LAzEQhoMoWKsH_0HAk4dtM_nYbLyVYlUouGI9hzQ7i1va3TZpqf33Rterc5n38Lwz8BByC2wEacbbuBsBz7U4IwPQEjKlmTonAyZylkkDxSW5inHFGJNGiAGRi0-kc3ekpWsr3DQ-0hRoGTA2Fbb7xq1p2R0xPNAJXbivru02p2tyUbt1xJu_PSQfs8fF9Dmbvz69TCfzzHOjRSYLtdRVXfgKagFqKX3FFHIJXkDOtMhzKZdaKskLw3Vep-gK6RWr0RvkKIbkrr-7Dd3ugHFvV90htOml5VIxDQa0SdR9T_nQxRiwttvQbFw4WWD2R4pNUuyvlMSOe_bYrPH0P2jL97e-8Q1qsmCW</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2450719179</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>The Law Pandemics and Presidential Power: A Taxonomy</title><source>Wiley Online Library</source><source>PAIS Index</source><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>EBSCOhost Political Science Complete</source><source>HeinOnline Law Journal Library database</source><creator>Rudalevige, Andrew ; Yu, Victoria E.</creator><creatorcontrib>Rudalevige, Andrew ; Yu, Victoria E.</creatorcontrib><description>Presidential power in a pandemic, as in other domestic crises, is largely a function of congressional delegation. A variety of statutes grant the president broad authority in times of emergency, including power over industrial production and quarantine power during outbreaks of communicable disease. Wide administrative discretion is spread across the U.S. Code more generally and may be implemented via executive order, regulations, or guidance documents. But while these powers may appear broad, they are hardly “total,” as President Donald Trump has asserted, and the president’s ability (or willingness) to use them is bounded by federalism, the potential constraints of legislative pushback, and political considerations.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0360-4918</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1741-5705</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/psq.12673</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Washington: Center for the Study of the Presidency</publisher><subject>Classification ; coronavirus ; COVID ; Defense Production Act ; Delegation ; emergency powers ; Executive orders ; Federalism ; Industrial production ; Infectious diseases ; Insurrection Act ; National Emergencies Act ; Pandemics ; Political power ; Power ; Presidential powers ; presidents ; public health ; Public Health Service Act ; Quarantine ; Regulation ; regulations ; Statutes</subject><ispartof>Presidential studies quarterly, 2020-09, Vol.50 (3), p.690-715</ispartof><rights>2020 Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2973-485b7df8cd1f315b4cd05e241c3160736644b7454289276f745a84c50fec9e2e3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2973-485b7df8cd1f315b4cd05e241c3160736644b7454289276f745a84c50fec9e2e3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fpsq.12673$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fpsq.12673$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,1417,27866,27924,27925,45574,45575</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Rudalevige, Andrew</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yu, Victoria E.</creatorcontrib><title>The Law Pandemics and Presidential Power: A Taxonomy</title><title>Presidential studies quarterly</title><description>Presidential power in a pandemic, as in other domestic crises, is largely a function of congressional delegation. A variety of statutes grant the president broad authority in times of emergency, including power over industrial production and quarantine power during outbreaks of communicable disease. Wide administrative discretion is spread across the U.S. Code more generally and may be implemented via executive order, regulations, or guidance documents. But while these powers may appear broad, they are hardly “total,” as President Donald Trump has asserted, and the president’s ability (or willingness) to use them is bounded by federalism, the potential constraints of legislative pushback, and political considerations.</description><subject>Classification</subject><subject>coronavirus</subject><subject>COVID</subject><subject>Defense Production Act</subject><subject>Delegation</subject><subject>emergency powers</subject><subject>Executive orders</subject><subject>Federalism</subject><subject>Industrial production</subject><subject>Infectious diseases</subject><subject>Insurrection Act</subject><subject>National Emergencies Act</subject><subject>Pandemics</subject><subject>Political power</subject><subject>Power</subject><subject>Presidential powers</subject><subject>presidents</subject><subject>public health</subject><subject>Public Health Service Act</subject><subject>Quarantine</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>regulations</subject><subject>Statutes</subject><issn>0360-4918</issn><issn>1741-5705</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNp1kE1LAzEQhoMoWKsH_0HAk4dtM_nYbLyVYlUouGI9hzQ7i1va3TZpqf33Rterc5n38Lwz8BByC2wEacbbuBsBz7U4IwPQEjKlmTonAyZylkkDxSW5inHFGJNGiAGRi0-kc3ekpWsr3DQ-0hRoGTA2Fbb7xq1p2R0xPNAJXbivru02p2tyUbt1xJu_PSQfs8fF9Dmbvz69TCfzzHOjRSYLtdRVXfgKagFqKX3FFHIJXkDOtMhzKZdaKskLw3Vep-gK6RWr0RvkKIbkrr-7Dd3ugHFvV90htOml5VIxDQa0SdR9T_nQxRiwttvQbFw4WWD2R4pNUuyvlMSOe_bYrPH0P2jL97e-8Q1qsmCW</recordid><startdate>202009</startdate><enddate>202009</enddate><creator>Rudalevige, Andrew</creator><creator>Yu, Victoria E.</creator><general>Center for the Study of the Presidency</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>4T-</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>202009</creationdate><title>The Law Pandemics and Presidential Power: A Taxonomy</title><author>Rudalevige, Andrew ; Yu, Victoria E.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c2973-485b7df8cd1f315b4cd05e241c3160736644b7454289276f745a84c50fec9e2e3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Classification</topic><topic>coronavirus</topic><topic>COVID</topic><topic>Defense Production Act</topic><topic>Delegation</topic><topic>emergency powers</topic><topic>Executive orders</topic><topic>Federalism</topic><topic>Industrial production</topic><topic>Infectious diseases</topic><topic>Insurrection Act</topic><topic>National Emergencies Act</topic><topic>Pandemics</topic><topic>Political power</topic><topic>Power</topic><topic>Presidential powers</topic><topic>presidents</topic><topic>public health</topic><topic>Public Health Service Act</topic><topic>Quarantine</topic><topic>Regulation</topic><topic>regulations</topic><topic>Statutes</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Rudalevige, Andrew</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yu, Victoria E.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Docstoc</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Presidential studies quarterly</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Rudalevige, Andrew</au><au>Yu, Victoria E.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The Law Pandemics and Presidential Power: A Taxonomy</atitle><jtitle>Presidential studies quarterly</jtitle><date>2020-09</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>50</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>690</spage><epage>715</epage><pages>690-715</pages><issn>0360-4918</issn><eissn>1741-5705</eissn><abstract>Presidential power in a pandemic, as in other domestic crises, is largely a function of congressional delegation. A variety of statutes grant the president broad authority in times of emergency, including power over industrial production and quarantine power during outbreaks of communicable disease. Wide administrative discretion is spread across the U.S. Code more generally and may be implemented via executive order, regulations, or guidance documents. But while these powers may appear broad, they are hardly “total,” as President Donald Trump has asserted, and the president’s ability (or willingness) to use them is bounded by federalism, the potential constraints of legislative pushback, and political considerations.</abstract><cop>Washington</cop><pub>Center for the Study of the Presidency</pub><doi>10.1111/psq.12673</doi><tpages>26</tpages></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 0360-4918 |
ispartof | Presidential studies quarterly, 2020-09, Vol.50 (3), p.690-715 |
issn | 0360-4918 1741-5705 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2450719179 |
source | Wiley Online Library; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; HeinOnline Law Journal Library database |
subjects | Classification coronavirus COVID Defense Production Act Delegation emergency powers Executive orders Federalism Industrial production Infectious diseases Insurrection Act National Emergencies Act Pandemics Political power Power Presidential powers presidents public health Public Health Service Act Quarantine Regulation regulations Statutes |
title | The Law Pandemics and Presidential Power: A Taxonomy |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-20T23%3A24%3A24IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The%20Law%20Pandemics%20and%20Presidential%20Power:%20A%20Taxonomy&rft.jtitle=Presidential%20studies%20quarterly&rft.au=Rudalevige,%20Andrew&rft.date=2020-09&rft.volume=50&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=690&rft.epage=715&rft.pages=690-715&rft.issn=0360-4918&rft.eissn=1741-5705&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/psq.12673&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2450719179%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2450719179&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |