Troops in “Harm's Way,” the President, and Congressional War‐Funding Decisions
Despite the conventional wisdom that legislators are reluctant to support funding restrictions impacting troops in harm's way, the degree of congressional deference varies across legislators. This article argues that the level of constituent support of the president affects this variation. Beca...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Presidential studies quarterly 2020-09, Vol.50 (3), p.568-591 |
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description | Despite the conventional wisdom that legislators are reluctant to support funding restrictions impacting troops in harm's way, the degree of congressional deference varies across legislators. This article argues that the level of constituent support of the president affects this variation. Because the deployment of troops is a salient event that highlights the connection between the president and the war, voters' view of the president becomes an effective indicator of voters' preference regarding the war. Thus, legislators whose constituents support (oppose) the president are more (less) likely to support the president's war policy. However, in the absence of major wars, constituent support of the president has no such effect. A series of analyses of House votes demonstrates how major wars condition the significance of voters' view of the president. |
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subjects | Constituents Deference Deployment Funding Legislators Presidents Voters War Wisdom |
title | Troops in “Harm's Way,” the President, and Congressional War‐Funding Decisions |
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