A “parasite market”: A competitive market of energy price comparison websites reduces consumer welfare
This article is about energy price comparison websites (PCWs). Using the example of Great Britain, it studies whether a competitive market of energy PCWs or a single non-commercial PCW can serve consumers better. Results are unambiguous. Households currently pay more than £100 million per year throu...
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description | This article is about energy price comparison websites (PCWs). Using the example of Great Britain, it studies whether a competitive market of energy PCWs or a single non-commercial PCW can serve consumers better. Results are unambiguous. Households currently pay more than £100 million per year through their energy bills to commercial energy PCWs. The business model of these PCWs is largely based on creating deviations from consumer choice considered ideal by the regulator. As a result, people overpay for energy and retail market competition is adversely affected. Furthermore, commercial PCWs do not efficiently increase consumer engagement, so more households are on expensive tariffs than in the alternative system. Commercial PCWs also introduce a number of risks. As trade-offs in the competitive case are unavoidable, regulatory changes cannot make the market better than the one-non-profit-site solution. A single non-commercial PCW, such as the one operated by Citizens Advice, can provide a higher quality service at a substantially lower cost. Therefore, the interests of consumers can best be protected by shutting down commercial PCWs. A theoretical insight is that a competitive market of PCWs emerges if not explicitly prohibited by regulation, but reduces consumer welfare: this should be considered a “parasite market”.
•Competitive market of energy price comparison websites or non-commercial monopoly?.•Competitive market more expensive, lower quality, more risky – problems irresolvable.•Publicly funded, non-commercial website appropriate to solve not very difficult task.•Commercial price comparison websites must be shut down to protect consumer interests.•Parasite market: competition emerges if not prohibited, but reduces consumer welfare. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111228 |
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•Competitive market of energy price comparison websites or non-commercial monopoly?.•Competitive market more expensive, lower quality, more risky – problems irresolvable.•Publicly funded, non-commercial website appropriate to solve not very difficult task.•Commercial price comparison websites must be shut down to protect consumer interests.•Parasite market: competition emerges if not prohibited, but reduces consumer welfare.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0301-4215</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-6777</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111228</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Kidlington: Elsevier Ltd</publisher><subject>Business ; Commercial energy ; Competition ; Consumer benefit ; Consumers ; Electronic intermediary ; Energy ; Energy policy ; Energy prices ; Households ; Info-mediation ; Markets ; Monopoly ; Nonprofit organizations ; Parasites ; Price comparison website ; Prices ; Shutdowns ; Tariffs ; Two-sided market ; Websites ; Welfare</subject><ispartof>Energy policy, 2020-03, Vol.138, p.1-13, Article 111228</ispartof><rights>2020 The Author</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. Mar 2020</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c437t-136ad9ae8b43519d2499b88684959250a27e9723fcdd02c13b3ad405f285bb273</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c437t-136ad9ae8b43519d2499b88684959250a27e9723fcdd02c13b3ad405f285bb273</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-3426-9916</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421519308109$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,3537,27843,27901,27902,65306</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Antal, Miklós</creatorcontrib><title>A “parasite market”: A competitive market of energy price comparison websites reduces consumer welfare</title><title>Energy policy</title><description>This article is about energy price comparison websites (PCWs). Using the example of Great Britain, it studies whether a competitive market of energy PCWs or a single non-commercial PCW can serve consumers better. Results are unambiguous. Households currently pay more than £100 million per year through their energy bills to commercial energy PCWs. The business model of these PCWs is largely based on creating deviations from consumer choice considered ideal by the regulator. As a result, people overpay for energy and retail market competition is adversely affected. Furthermore, commercial PCWs do not efficiently increase consumer engagement, so more households are on expensive tariffs than in the alternative system. Commercial PCWs also introduce a number of risks. As trade-offs in the competitive case are unavoidable, regulatory changes cannot make the market better than the one-non-profit-site solution. A single non-commercial PCW, such as the one operated by Citizens Advice, can provide a higher quality service at a substantially lower cost. Therefore, the interests of consumers can best be protected by shutting down commercial PCWs. A theoretical insight is that a competitive market of PCWs emerges if not explicitly prohibited by regulation, but reduces consumer welfare: this should be considered a “parasite market”.
•Competitive market of energy price comparison websites or non-commercial monopoly?.•Competitive market more expensive, lower quality, more risky – problems irresolvable.•Publicly funded, non-commercial website appropriate to solve not very difficult task.•Commercial price comparison websites must be shut down to protect consumer interests.•Parasite market: competition emerges if not prohibited, but reduces consumer welfare.</description><subject>Business</subject><subject>Commercial energy</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Consumer benefit</subject><subject>Consumers</subject><subject>Electronic intermediary</subject><subject>Energy</subject><subject>Energy policy</subject><subject>Energy prices</subject><subject>Households</subject><subject>Info-mediation</subject><subject>Markets</subject><subject>Monopoly</subject><subject>Nonprofit organizations</subject><subject>Parasites</subject><subject>Price comparison 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Miklós</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A “parasite market”: A competitive market of energy price comparison websites reduces consumer welfare</atitle><jtitle>Energy policy</jtitle><date>2020-03</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>138</volume><spage>1</spage><epage>13</epage><pages>1-13</pages><artnum>111228</artnum><issn>0301-4215</issn><eissn>1873-6777</eissn><abstract>This article is about energy price comparison websites (PCWs). Using the example of Great Britain, it studies whether a competitive market of energy PCWs or a single non-commercial PCW can serve consumers better. Results are unambiguous. Households currently pay more than £100 million per year through their energy bills to commercial energy PCWs. The business model of these PCWs is largely based on creating deviations from consumer choice considered ideal by the regulator. As a result, people overpay for energy and retail market competition is adversely affected. Furthermore, commercial PCWs do not efficiently increase consumer engagement, so more households are on expensive tariffs than in the alternative system. Commercial PCWs also introduce a number of risks. As trade-offs in the competitive case are unavoidable, regulatory changes cannot make the market better than the one-non-profit-site solution. A single non-commercial PCW, such as the one operated by Citizens Advice, can provide a higher quality service at a substantially lower cost. Therefore, the interests of consumers can best be protected by shutting down commercial PCWs. A theoretical insight is that a competitive market of PCWs emerges if not explicitly prohibited by regulation, but reduces consumer welfare: this should be considered a “parasite market”.
•Competitive market of energy price comparison websites or non-commercial monopoly?.•Competitive market more expensive, lower quality, more risky – problems irresolvable.•Publicly funded, non-commercial website appropriate to solve not very difficult task.•Commercial price comparison websites must be shut down to protect consumer interests.•Parasite market: competition emerges if not prohibited, but reduces consumer welfare.</abstract><cop>Kidlington</cop><pub>Elsevier Ltd</pub><doi>10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111228</doi><tpages>13</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3426-9916</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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subjects | Business Commercial energy Competition Consumer benefit Consumers Electronic intermediary Energy Energy policy Energy prices Households Info-mediation Markets Monopoly Nonprofit organizations Parasites Price comparison website Prices Shutdowns Tariffs Two-sided market Websites Welfare |
title | A “parasite market”: A competitive market of energy price comparison websites reduces consumer welfare |
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