What are the best quorum rules? A laboratory investigation
Many political systems with direct democracy mechanisms have adopted rules preventing decisions from being made by simple majority rule. The device added most commonly to majority rule in national referendums is a quorum requirement. The two most common are participation and approval quorums. Such r...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 2020-10, Vol.185 (1/2), p.215-231 |
---|---|
Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | 231 |
---|---|
container_issue | 1/2 |
container_start_page | 215 |
container_title | Public choice |
container_volume | 185 |
creator | Aguiar-Conraria, Luís Magalhães, Pedro C. Vanberg, Christoph A. |
description | Many political systems with direct democracy mechanisms have adopted rules preventing decisions from being made by simple majority rule. The device added most commonly to majority rule in national referendums is a quorum requirement. The two most common are participation and approval quorums. Such rules are responses to three major concerns: the legitimacy of the referendum outcome, its representativeness, and protection of minorities regarding issues that should demand a broad consensus. Guided by a pivotal voter model, we conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the performances of different quorums in attaining such goals. We introduce two main innovations in relation to previous work on the topic. First, part of the electorate goes to the polls out of a sense of civic duty. Second, we test the performances of a different quorum, the rejection quorum, recently proposed in the literature. We conclude that, depending on the preferred criterion, either the approval or the rejection quorum is the best. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11127-019-00749-6 |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2439112783</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>48733700</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>48733700</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c475t-df72390dc8118a41dff601376c7096351a7b5b5a2d8a04ad1b84328feaa414023</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kF1LwzAYhYMoOKd_QBACXkffN0mb1BsZ4hcMvFG8DGmbzo7ZbEkr7N-bWXF3XoWQ55xDHkLOEa4QQF1HROSKARYsXWXB8gMywUwJphDwkEwApGaZ5sUxOYlxCQAi19mE3Lx_2J7a4Gj_4WjpYk83gw_DJw3DysVbOqMrW_pgex-2tO2-EtEubN_67pQcNXYV3dnvOSVvD_evd09s_vL4fDebs0qqrGd1o7gooK40orYS66bJAYXKKwVFLjK0qszKzPJaW5C2xlJLwXXjbIIlcDEll2PvOvjNkPbN0g-hS5OGS1HsPq5FovhIVcHHGFxj1qH9tGFrEMzOkRkdmeTI_DgyeQrRMeQq37VxH1HJjtZFKp4SMSIxPXYLF_br_xZfjKllTOL-eqVWQqjk_htFmnwa</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2439112783</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>What are the best quorum rules? A laboratory investigation</title><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>Jstor Complete Legacy</source><source>EBSCOhost Political Science Complete</source><source>SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings</source><creator>Aguiar-Conraria, Luís ; Magalhães, Pedro C. ; Vanberg, Christoph A.</creator><creatorcontrib>Aguiar-Conraria, Luís ; Magalhães, Pedro C. ; Vanberg, Christoph A.</creatorcontrib><description>Many political systems with direct democracy mechanisms have adopted rules preventing decisions from being made by simple majority rule. The device added most commonly to majority rule in national referendums is a quorum requirement. The two most common are participation and approval quorums. Such rules are responses to three major concerns: the legitimacy of the referendum outcome, its representativeness, and protection of minorities regarding issues that should demand a broad consensus. Guided by a pivotal voter model, we conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the performances of different quorums in attaining such goals. We introduce two main innovations in relation to previous work on the topic. First, part of the electorate goes to the polls out of a sense of civic duty. Second, we test the performances of a different quorum, the rejection quorum, recently proposed in the literature. We conclude that, depending on the preferred criterion, either the approval or the rejection quorum is the best.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0048-5829</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1573-7101</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00749-6</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: Springer Science + Business Media</publisher><subject>Democracy ; Direct democracy ; Economics ; Economics and Finance ; Innovations ; Laboratories ; Legitimacy ; Majority rule ; Minority groups ; Political Science ; Political systems ; Polls & surveys ; Public Finance ; Quorum ; Referendums ; Representativeness ; Rules ; Voters</subject><ispartof>Public choice, 2020-10, Vol.185 (1/2), p.215-231</ispartof><rights>Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019</rights><rights>Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c475t-df72390dc8118a41dff601376c7096351a7b5b5a2d8a04ad1b84328feaa414023</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c475t-df72390dc8118a41dff601376c7096351a7b5b5a2d8a04ad1b84328feaa414023</cites><orcidid>0000-0001-6822-7103</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48733700$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/48733700$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,12845,27924,27925,41488,42557,51319,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Aguiar-Conraria, Luís</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Magalhães, Pedro C.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Vanberg, Christoph A.</creatorcontrib><title>What are the best quorum rules? A laboratory investigation</title><title>Public choice</title><addtitle>Public Choice</addtitle><description>Many political systems with direct democracy mechanisms have adopted rules preventing decisions from being made by simple majority rule. The device added most commonly to majority rule in national referendums is a quorum requirement. The two most common are participation and approval quorums. Such rules are responses to three major concerns: the legitimacy of the referendum outcome, its representativeness, and protection of minorities regarding issues that should demand a broad consensus. Guided by a pivotal voter model, we conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the performances of different quorums in attaining such goals. We introduce two main innovations in relation to previous work on the topic. First, part of the electorate goes to the polls out of a sense of civic duty. Second, we test the performances of a different quorum, the rejection quorum, recently proposed in the literature. We conclude that, depending on the preferred criterion, either the approval or the rejection quorum is the best.</description><subject>Democracy</subject><subject>Direct democracy</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Innovations</subject><subject>Laboratories</subject><subject>Legitimacy</subject><subject>Majority rule</subject><subject>Minority groups</subject><subject>Political Science</subject><subject>Political systems</subject><subject>Polls & surveys</subject><subject>Public Finance</subject><subject>Quorum</subject><subject>Referendums</subject><subject>Representativeness</subject><subject>Rules</subject><subject>Voters</subject><issn>0048-5829</issn><issn>1573-7101</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kF1LwzAYhYMoOKd_QBACXkffN0mb1BsZ4hcMvFG8DGmbzo7ZbEkr7N-bWXF3XoWQ55xDHkLOEa4QQF1HROSKARYsXWXB8gMywUwJphDwkEwApGaZ5sUxOYlxCQAi19mE3Lx_2J7a4Gj_4WjpYk83gw_DJw3DysVbOqMrW_pgex-2tO2-EtEubN_67pQcNXYV3dnvOSVvD_evd09s_vL4fDebs0qqrGd1o7gooK40orYS66bJAYXKKwVFLjK0qszKzPJaW5C2xlJLwXXjbIIlcDEll2PvOvjNkPbN0g-hS5OGS1HsPq5FovhIVcHHGFxj1qH9tGFrEMzOkRkdmeTI_DgyeQrRMeQq37VxH1HJjtZFKp4SMSIxPXYLF_br_xZfjKllTOL-eqVWQqjk_htFmnwa</recordid><startdate>20201001</startdate><enddate>20201001</enddate><creator>Aguiar-Conraria, Luís</creator><creator>Magalhães, Pedro C.</creator><creator>Vanberg, Christoph A.</creator><general>Springer Science + Business Media</general><general>Springer US</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88C</scope><scope>88J</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DPSOV</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>HEHIP</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K8~</scope><scope>KC-</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M2L</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>M2S</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6822-7103</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20201001</creationdate><title>What are the best quorum rules? A laboratory investigation</title><author>Aguiar-Conraria, Luís ; Magalhães, Pedro C. ; Vanberg, Christoph A.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c475t-df72390dc8118a41dff601376c7096351a7b5b5a2d8a04ad1b84328feaa414023</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Democracy</topic><topic>Direct democracy</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Economics and Finance</topic><topic>Innovations</topic><topic>Laboratories</topic><topic>Legitimacy</topic><topic>Majority rule</topic><topic>Minority groups</topic><topic>Political Science</topic><topic>Political systems</topic><topic>Polls & surveys</topic><topic>Public Finance</topic><topic>Quorum</topic><topic>Referendums</topic><topic>Representativeness</topic><topic>Rules</topic><topic>Voters</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Aguiar-Conraria, Luís</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Magalhães, Pedro C.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Vanberg, Christoph A.</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database (Alumni)</collection><collection>Social Science Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>Politics Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>Sociology Collection</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>DELNET Management Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Politics Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database</collection><collection>Political Science Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Social Science Database</collection><collection>Sociology Database</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Public choice</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Aguiar-Conraria, Luís</au><au>Magalhães, Pedro C.</au><au>Vanberg, Christoph A.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>What are the best quorum rules? A laboratory investigation</atitle><jtitle>Public choice</jtitle><stitle>Public Choice</stitle><date>2020-10-01</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>185</volume><issue>1/2</issue><spage>215</spage><epage>231</epage><pages>215-231</pages><issn>0048-5829</issn><eissn>1573-7101</eissn><abstract>Many political systems with direct democracy mechanisms have adopted rules preventing decisions from being made by simple majority rule. The device added most commonly to majority rule in national referendums is a quorum requirement. The two most common are participation and approval quorums. Such rules are responses to three major concerns: the legitimacy of the referendum outcome, its representativeness, and protection of minorities regarding issues that should demand a broad consensus. Guided by a pivotal voter model, we conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the performances of different quorums in attaining such goals. We introduce two main innovations in relation to previous work on the topic. First, part of the electorate goes to the polls out of a sense of civic duty. Second, we test the performances of a different quorum, the rejection quorum, recently proposed in the literature. We conclude that, depending on the preferred criterion, either the approval or the rejection quorum is the best.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>Springer Science + Business Media</pub><doi>10.1007/s11127-019-00749-6</doi><tpages>17</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6822-7103</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 0048-5829 |
ispartof | Public choice, 2020-10, Vol.185 (1/2), p.215-231 |
issn | 0048-5829 1573-7101 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2439112783 |
source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
subjects | Democracy Direct democracy Economics Economics and Finance Innovations Laboratories Legitimacy Majority rule Minority groups Political Science Political systems Polls & surveys Public Finance Quorum Referendums Representativeness Rules Voters |
title | What are the best quorum rules? A laboratory investigation |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-28T15%3A04%3A01IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=What%20are%20the%20best%20quorum%20rules?%20A%20laboratory%20investigation&rft.jtitle=Public%20choice&rft.au=Aguiar-Conraria,%20Lu%C3%ADs&rft.date=2020-10-01&rft.volume=185&rft.issue=1/2&rft.spage=215&rft.epage=231&rft.pages=215-231&rft.issn=0048-5829&rft.eissn=1573-7101&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/s11127-019-00749-6&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E48733700%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2439112783&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=48733700&rfr_iscdi=true |