What makes coups outside the chain of command in Turkey succeed or fail?
Existing work on civil-military relations in Turkey has left the question of coup outcomes understudied. Although coups organized in line with the military chain of command are automatically assumed most likely to succeed, not all coup attempts carried out by junior/mid-ranking officers are doomed t...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Mediterranean politics (Frank Cass & Co.) 2020-08, Vol.25 (4), p.433-455 |
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| creator | Aslan, Ömer |
| description | Existing work on civil-military relations in Turkey has left the question of coup outcomes understudied. Although coups organized in line with the military chain of command are automatically assumed most likely to succeed, not all coup attempts carried out by junior/mid-ranking officers are doomed to fail. While 27 May 1960 coup by junior officers succeeded, three other coups attempted outside the chain of command in 1962, 1963, and 15 July 2016 in Turkey failed. Why? This article uses 'coordination game' framework as a theoretical tool to provide an answer. These cases lend significant support to application of game theoretic models to the literature on military coup outcomes. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1080/13629395.2018.1554093 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Mediterranean politics (Frank Cass & Co.), 2020-08, Vol.25 (4), p.433-455 |
| issn | 1362-9395 1743-9418 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Political Science Complete; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts |
| subjects | 15 July 2016 27 May 1960 Armed forces Civil-military relations Commands Coordination Coordination games Coups d'etat Game theory Gulenists Ratings & rankings Talat Aydemir Turkish armed forces |
| title | What makes coups outside the chain of command in Turkey succeed or fail? |
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