Enforce taxes, but cautiously: societal implications of the slippery slope framework
The general public often demands more frequent audits and harsher penalties to discourage tax evasion. This paper explores how deterrence via better-equipped tax agencies interrelates with the motivation to voluntarily pay taxes, and how both factors jointly influence tax evasion. For a panel of up...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | European journal of law and economics 2020-08, Vol.50 (1), p.149-170 |
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| container_title | European journal of law and economics |
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| creator | Tsikas, Stefanos A. |
| description | The general public often demands more frequent audits and harsher penalties to discourage tax evasion. This paper explores how deterrence via better-equipped tax agencies interrelates with the motivation to voluntarily pay taxes, and how both factors jointly influence tax evasion. For a panel of up to 25 European countries, this paper studies aggregate implications of the Slippery Slope hypothesis of tax compliance, and contributes to the literature on the societal dimension of tax evasion. The results suggest that both higher trust in authorities and increased deterrence efforts are positively associated with tax compliance. Trust and deterrence interact and depend on each other: if trust in authorities is low, an increase in tax enforcement works best for narrowing the tax gap (and vice versa). Generally, the positive influence of trust diminishes with increasing deterrence. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10657-020-09660-8 |
| format | Article |
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| subjects | Commercial Law Compliance Deterrence Economics Economics and Finance Enforcement European Integration Experiments Fines & penalties Fines and penalties General public Law and Economics Law enforcement Motivation Penalties Public Finance Tax audits Tax evasion Tax increases Taxation Taxes |
| title | Enforce taxes, but cautiously: societal implications of the slippery slope framework |
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