Institutional design, political competition and spillovers
We establish a link between the best system of government and the strength of inter-state spillovers within a model of political competition with self-interested parties. We show the superiority of the unitary system when: inter-state spillovers are strong; the ego rents of local parties are high; a...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Regional science and urban economics 2020-03, Vol.81, p.103505, Article 103505 |
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| container_title | Regional science and urban economics |
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| creator | Alderighi, Marco Feder, Christophe |
| description | We establish a link between the best system of government and the strength of inter-state spillovers within a model of political competition with self-interested parties. We show the superiority of the unitary system when: inter-state spillovers are strong; the ego rents of local parties are high; and the system of government is chosen under a veil of ignorance.
•We study unitary vs federal systems within a model of political competition.•Parties face a trade-off between their power and winning the election.•The unitary system is better if interstate spillovers and local ego rents are high.•The unitary system is better in the worst-case scenario.•Excessive (de)centralization leads to larger losses if spillovers are (weak) strong. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.103505 |
| format | Article |
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•We study unitary vs federal systems within a model of political competition.•Parties face a trade-off between their power and winning the election.•The unitary system is better if interstate spillovers and local ego rents are high.•The unitary system is better in the worst-case scenario.•Excessive (de)centralization leads to larger losses if spillovers are (weak) strong.</description><subject>Allocation of power</subject><subject>Ego</subject><subject>Federalism</subject><subject>Government</subject><subject>Ignorance</subject><subject>Institutional design</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>Public administration</subject><subject>Rents</subject><subject>Self-interested politicians</subject><subject>Voting</subject><issn>0166-0462</issn><issn>1879-2308</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqNkEtPwzAQhC0EEqXwHyK4kuJHHCe9ofKqVIkLnC3H3lSO0jjYTiX-Pa7CgSOnlXa-Hc0OQrcErwgm5UO38rAP2k6-Ae1WFJM6CYxjfoYWpBJ1ThmuztEiwWWOi5JeoqsQOozTgrIFWm-HEG2conWD6jMDwe6H-2x0vY1Wp412hxESkfRMDSYLo-17dwQfrtFFq_oAN79ziT5fnj82b_nu_XW7edzlmlERc1oQ2ghBSlzXvK6gZpgqWhWac0xJ0fCqaVugBS5TUiiMEklXbWOw0UYBZ0t0N_uO3n1NEKLs3ORT2iBpQQUjggiWqPVMae9C8NDK0duD8t-SYHnqSnbyb1fy1JWcu0rHT_MxpD-OFrxMHAwajPWgozTO_sfmB0a8eQY</recordid><startdate>20200301</startdate><enddate>20200301</enddate><creator>Alderighi, Marco</creator><creator>Feder, Christophe</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier Sequoia S.A</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2001-5678</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20200301</creationdate><title>Institutional design, political competition and spillovers</title><author>Alderighi, Marco ; Feder, Christophe</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c327t-2412b7716099598e9302a284c550214b58bffe2406308e4da702aafbd0dcdae53</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Allocation of power</topic><topic>Ego</topic><topic>Federalism</topic><topic>Government</topic><topic>Ignorance</topic><topic>Institutional design</topic><topic>Politics</topic><topic>Public administration</topic><topic>Rents</topic><topic>Self-interested politicians</topic><topic>Voting</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Alderighi, Marco</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Feder, Christophe</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Regional science and urban economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Alderighi, Marco</au><au>Feder, Christophe</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Institutional design, political competition and spillovers</atitle><jtitle>Regional science and urban economics</jtitle><date>2020-03-01</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>81</volume><spage>103505</spage><pages>103505-</pages><artnum>103505</artnum><issn>0166-0462</issn><eissn>1879-2308</eissn><abstract>We establish a link between the best system of government and the strength of inter-state spillovers within a model of political competition with self-interested parties. We show the superiority of the unitary system when: inter-state spillovers are strong; the ego rents of local parties are high; and the system of government is chosen under a veil of ignorance.
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0166-0462 |
| ispartof | Regional science and urban economics, 2020-03, Vol.81, p.103505, Article 103505 |
| issn | 0166-0462 1879-2308 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2427317173 |
| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Allocation of power Ego Federalism Government Ignorance Institutional design Politics Public administration Rents Self-interested politicians Voting |
| title | Institutional design, political competition and spillovers |
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