Production and Pricing Strategies of Energy-Saving Products in the Presence of Duopolistic Manufacturers
This paper considers optimal production and pricing strategies of energy-saving products in the presence of duopolistic manufacturers. First, we analyze the free competition case by a Bertrand game. A sufficient condition for guaranteeing the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Mathematical problems in engineering 2020, Vol.2020 (2020), p.1-9 |
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| creator | Lou, Xuming Dai, Xiaozhen Lou, Zhenkai |
| description | This paper considers optimal production and pricing strategies of energy-saving products in the presence of duopolistic manufacturers. First, we analyze the free competition case by a Bertrand game. A sufficient condition for guaranteeing the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution is proposed. The change rate of the benefit function of environment with regard to purchasing preference proportions is examined. Second, we investigate the case in the presence of energy-saving incentive. A two-layer decision model is constructed by considering the decision order of each participant. Optimal strategies between the two cases are compared. We provide theoretical foundations for the government to formulate policies of energy-saving incentive under a financial budget constraint. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the obtained conclusions and make some supplements. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1155/2020/8954262 |
| format | Article |
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First, we analyze the free competition case by a Bertrand game. A sufficient condition for guaranteeing the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution is proposed. The change rate of the benefit function of environment with regard to purchasing preference proportions is examined. Second, we investigate the case in the presence of energy-saving incentive. A two-layer decision model is constructed by considering the decision order of each participant. Optimal strategies between the two cases are compared. We provide theoretical foundations for the government to formulate policies of energy-saving incentive under a financial budget constraint. 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| source | Wiley Online Library Open Access; EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Competition Consumers Cooperation Energy Energy conservation Manufacturers Mathematical problems Pricing Revenue sharing Supply chains |
| title | Production and Pricing Strategies of Energy-Saving Products in the Presence of Duopolistic Manufacturers |
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