CHEAP TALK WITH TRANSPARENT MOTIVES

We study a model of cheap talk with one substantive assumption: The sender’s preferences are state independent. Our main observation is that such a sender gains credibility by degrading self-serving information. Using this observation, we examine the sender’s benefits from communication, assess the...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Econometrica 2020-07, Vol.88 (4), p.1631-1660
Hauptverfasser:	Lipnowski, Elliot, Ravid, Doron
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	belief‐based approach Cheap talk Communication Credibility Information information design information transmission persuasion Preferences quasiconcave envelope securability
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container_title	Econometrica
container_volume	88
creator	Lipnowski, Elliot Ravid, Doron
description	We study a model of cheap talk with one substantive assumption: The sender’s preferences are state independent. Our main observation is that such a sender gains credibility by degrading self-serving information. Using this observation, we examine the sender’s benefits from communication, assess the value of commitment, and explicitly solve for sender-optimal equilibria in three examples. A key result is a geometric characterization of the value of cheap talk, described by the quasiconcave envelope of the sender’s value function.
doi_str_mv	10.3982/ECTA15674
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source	Jstor Complete Legacy; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; JSTOR Mathematics & Statistics
subjects	belief‐based approach Cheap talk Communication Credibility Information information design information transmission persuasion Preferences quasiconcave envelope securability
title	CHEAP TALK WITH TRANSPARENT MOTIVES
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