Production priorities in dynamic relationships

We characterise optimal contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model of joint production in which project opportunities are heterogenous, utility from these projects is non-transferable and the agent has the option to quit the relationship at any time. In order to demand the production of projects t...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Theoretical economics 2020-07, Vol.15 (3), p.861-889
Hauptverfasser:	Forand, Jean Guillaume, Zapal, Jan
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agents C73 Compensation Cost analysis D86 Dynamic contracts Economic theory Employee management relations Flexibility heterogenous projects incentive provision L24 Monetary incentives Principal-agent models Projects Supplies Supply & demand
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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