Do Effort Differences between Bonus and Penalty Contracts Persist in Labor Markets?

Conventional economics assumes workers provide the same effort under penalty contracts and economically equivalent bonus contracts. However, prior research finds that although workers prefer bonus contracts, they provide more effort under penalty contracts. Given these findings, the prevalence of bo...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Accounting review 2020-05, Vol.95 (3), p.205-222
Hauptverfasser: Gonzalez, George C., Hoffman, Vicky B., Moser, Donald V.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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