Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents

This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing incentive schemes under bounded rationality. It starts from a standard principal-agent model and then superimposes an assumption of boundedly rational behavior on the part of the agent. Boundedly rational behavior is modeled as an explicit op...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 2003-06, Vol.3 (1), p.2
1. Verfasser:	Basov, Suren
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	bounded rationality Decision making Decision theory Economic analysis Economic behaviour Economic models Economic theory Economics Expected utility Financial incentives Imitation Incentives Moral hazard Multiculturalism & pluralism Noise Optimization Population principal-agent model Principal-agent models Principal-agent theory Rational expectations Rationality Statistical analysis Studies Wages & salaries
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