Legislative bargaining and partisan delegation

We use an extension of the Baron–Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining in which there are three legislators, two of whom have partisan ties, to analyze the division of a fixed political resource in a majoritarian legislature. A legislator’s preferences depend on the shares that he and any coparti...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of theoretical politics 2020-04, Vol.32 (2), p.289-311
Hauptverfasser:	Choate, Thomas, Weymark, John A, Wiseman, Alan E
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Acknowledgment Bargaining Delegation Legislators Legislatures Partisanship Political leadership Political parties
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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