Democracy's Pin Factory: Issue Specialization, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and Epistemic Performance
This article describes how issue specialization through deliberative institutions called "issue publics" can improve the quality of democratic decision making. Issue specialization improves decisions by instantiating a cognitive division of labor among the mass public, which creates effici...
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Veröffentlicht in: | American journal of political science 2020-04, Vol.64 (2), p.385-397 |
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description | This article describes how issue specialization through deliberative institutions called "issue publics" can improve the quality of democratic decision making. Issue specialization improves decisions by instantiating a cognitive division of labor among the mass public, which creates efficiencies in decision making and grants large groups of average citizens a scalable advantage over small groups of even the smartest and most capable individuals. Issue specialization further improves decisions by capturing issue-specific information, concentrating it within the specialized deliberative enclaves of issue publics, and refining citizens' issue preferences. These advantages are brought to bear in wider democratic politics and policy through information shortcuts and through the specialized electoral incentives of representatives. The article responds to concerns about political ignorance, polarization/partisanship, rent seeking, and socioeconomic bias and argues that issue specialization can provide a valuable brake to polarization yet needs institutional supplementation to engage marginalized citizens and combat bias. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/ajps.12486 |
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The article responds to concerns about political ignorance, polarization/partisanship, rent seeking, and socioeconomic bias and argues that issue specialization can provide a valuable brake to polarization yet needs institutional supplementation to engage marginalized citizens and combat bias.</description><subject>Bias</subject><subject>Citizens</subject><subject>Cognition</subject><subject>Decision making</subject><subject>Democracy</subject><subject>Division of labor</subject><subject>Elections</subject><subject>General public</subject><subject>Grants</subject><subject>Ignorance</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>Large groups</subject><subject>Partisanship</subject><subject>Polarization</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>Rent-seeking</subject><subject>Small groups</subject><subject>Specialization</subject><issn>0092-5853</issn><issn>1540-5907</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kF1LwzAUhoMoOKc3_oKAiCCrJk3SNt6Nfehk4GB6HdI01ZS1qUk3qb_ezip45bk558DzngMPAOcY3eCubmVR-xsc0iQ6AAPMKAoYR_EhGCDEw4AljByDE-8L1O2UkwEwU11a5aRqrzxcmQrOpWqsa-_gwvuthutaKyM35lM2xlYj2LxpODU747sN2hxO7GtlGrPTcClT60ZQVhmc1cY3ujQKrrTLrStlpfQpOMrlxuuznz4EL_PZ8-QhWD7dLybjZaAIwVEQpzLDVEtMGMUow0mUMy0V4SlNcZxGiUxYFCqEKOIyyjOkk4hqrPJYkW7kZAgu-ru1s-9b7RtR2K2rupciJEnMOWIh6qjrnlLOeu90LmpnSulagZHYqxR7leJbZQfjHv4wG93-Q4rx42r9m7nsM4XvfP7NhATFgrKQMxJi8gXL_4HT</recordid><startdate>20200401</startdate><enddate>20200401</enddate><creator>Elliott, Kevin J.</creator><general>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</general><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20200401</creationdate><title>Democracy's Pin Factory: Issue Specialization, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and Epistemic Performance</title><author>Elliott, Kevin J.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3316-7bad14ea135410d186f5eac39b4b17b68a8562c00409a6fd0e864e1cf7c3e8693</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Bias</topic><topic>Citizens</topic><topic>Cognition</topic><topic>Decision making</topic><topic>Democracy</topic><topic>Division of labor</topic><topic>Elections</topic><topic>General public</topic><topic>Grants</topic><topic>Ignorance</topic><topic>Incentives</topic><topic>Large groups</topic><topic>Partisanship</topic><topic>Polarization</topic><topic>Politics</topic><topic>Rent-seeking</topic><topic>Small groups</topic><topic>Specialization</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Elliott, Kevin J.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>American journal of political science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Elliott, Kevin J.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Democracy's Pin Factory: Issue Specialization, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and Epistemic Performance</atitle><jtitle>American journal of political science</jtitle><date>2020-04-01</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>64</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>385</spage><epage>397</epage><pages>385-397</pages><issn>0092-5853</issn><eissn>1540-5907</eissn><abstract>This article describes how issue specialization through deliberative institutions called "issue publics" can improve the quality of democratic decision making. 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source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Access via Wiley Online Library; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
subjects | Bias Citizens Cognition Decision making Democracy Division of labor Elections General public Grants Ignorance Incentives Large groups Partisanship Polarization Politics Rent-seeking Small groups Specialization |
title | Democracy's Pin Factory: Issue Specialization, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and Epistemic Performance |
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