Indirect taxation with shadow cost of public funds in mixed oligopoly

We adopt a mixed oligopoly model, where a state‐owned welfare‐maximizing public firm competes with a profit‐maximizing private firm, to compare the welfare effects of the specific and ad valorem tax in the presence of the shadow cost of public funds. Following the assumption of most previous literat...

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Veröffentlicht in:Managerial and decision economics 2020-04, Vol.41 (3), p.415-425
Hauptverfasser: Zhang, Qidi, Wang, Leonard F.S., Yang, Yapo
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Sprache:eng
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