QUALITY DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION
We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. We show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare comparison depends on the lev...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of industrial economics 2009-03, Vol.57 (1), p.167-196 |
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| container_end_page | 196 |
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| container_issue | 1 |
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| container_title | The Journal of industrial economics |
| container_volume | 57 |
| creator | LEVIN, DAN PECK, JAMES YE, LIXIN |
| description | We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. We show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost: when the disclosure cost is low, welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly, but when the disclosure cost is high, welfare is higher under duopoly. In either market structure, disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus, but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00366.x |
| format | Article |
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We show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost: when the disclosure cost is low, welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly, but when the disclosure cost is high, welfare is higher under duopoly. 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In either market structure, disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus, but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus.</description><subject>Cartels</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Consumer economics</subject><subject>Consumer equilibrium</subject><subject>Consumer prices</subject><subject>Disclosure</subject><subject>Duopolies</subject><subject>Duopoly</subject><subject>Economic competition</subject><subject>Financial market structures</subject><subject>Market share</subject><subject>Product quality</subject><subject>Publishing industry</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Symposium on Advertising and Disclosure</subject><subject>Total surplus</subject><issn>0022-1821</issn><issn>1467-6451</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2009</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkEtPwkAUhSdGExH9CSYN-9Y7M51HFy5IW7GkUpES42pS-kioaHEKEf69U2tYO5s7yTnfvTkHIQuDg827qx3scmFzl2GHAHgOAOXcOZyhwUk4RwMAQmwsCb5EV21bg3EyKgZoNF-O4yh9s4Jo4cfJYvkSWuNZYPnJ03OYRmmUzK7RRZVt2vLmbw7R8iFM_Uc7TiaRP47t3JWY27mkAFKUmAAnvPIkZysp5QoDMIoFFYUxSIYrzjwQubmfFW4JVQGkAFZ5dIhG_d6tbr72ZbtTdbPXn-akIpR7WApMjUn2plw3bavLSm31-iPTR4VBdYWoWnW5VZdbdYWo30LUwaD3Pfq93pTHf3NqmkSh-Rn-tufrdtfoE0-YK6nLXKPbvb5ud-XhpGf6XXETn6nX2UTR-VSwYBaomP4Ak0l4VQ</recordid><startdate>200903</startdate><enddate>200903</enddate><creator>LEVIN, DAN</creator><creator>PECK, JAMES</creator><creator>YE, LIXIN</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><general>Blackwell Publishing</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200903</creationdate><title>QUALITY DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION</title><author>LEVIN, DAN ; PECK, JAMES ; YE, LIXIN</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4816-c830087e120626f9865b888b100531737d830851f65907c095ad4e0fd02d05f93</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2009</creationdate><topic>Cartels</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Consumer economics</topic><topic>Consumer equilibrium</topic><topic>Consumer prices</topic><topic>Disclosure</topic><topic>Duopolies</topic><topic>Duopoly</topic><topic>Economic competition</topic><topic>Financial market structures</topic><topic>Market share</topic><topic>Product quality</topic><topic>Publishing industry</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Symposium on Advertising and Disclosure</topic><topic>Total surplus</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>LEVIN, DAN</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>PECK, JAMES</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>YE, LIXIN</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Journal of industrial economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>LEVIN, DAN</au><au>PECK, JAMES</au><au>YE, LIXIN</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>QUALITY DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION</atitle><jtitle>The Journal of industrial economics</jtitle><date>2009-03</date><risdate>2009</risdate><volume>57</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>167</spage><epage>196</epage><pages>167-196</pages><issn>0022-1821</issn><eissn>1467-6451</eissn><coden>JIEOAF</coden><abstract>We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. 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| ispartof | The Journal of industrial economics, 2009-03, Vol.57 (1), p.167-196 |
| issn | 0022-1821 1467-6451 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; PAIS Index; Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy |
| subjects | Cartels Competition Consumer economics Consumer equilibrium Consumer prices Disclosure Duopolies Duopoly Economic competition Financial market structures Market share Product quality Publishing industry Studies Symposium on Advertising and Disclosure Total surplus |
| title | QUALITY DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION |
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