Coordinating under incomplete information
We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equ...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Review of economic design 2008-12, Vol.12 (4), p.293-313 |
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| container_title | Review of economic design |
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| creator | Asheim, Geir B. Yoo, Seung Han |
| description | We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10058-008-0061-8 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Review of economic design, 2008-12, Vol.12 (4), p.293-313 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | SpringerLink Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Bayesian analysis Behavioral/Experimental Economics Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Equilibrium Game Theory Games Information Microeconomics Noise Original Paper Public good Social and Behav. Sciences Studies Willingness to pay |
| title | Coordinating under incomplete information |
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