Does Disputing Through Agents Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence

A distinctive characteristic of our mechanisms for conflict resolution is that litigation is carried out by agents chosen by disputing principals. Does the fact that clients choose lawyers to carry on their disputes facilitate dispute resolution or instead exacerbate conflict? The dominant contempor...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of legal studies 1997-06, Vol.26 (2), p.331-345
Hauptverfasser:	Croson, Rachel, Mnookin, Robert H.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Attorneys Bargaining theory Conflict resolution Cooperation Economic models Game theory Law schools Lawyer client communication Litigation Litigation parties Mediation Nash equilibrium Prison art Prisons
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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