Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only
Fix a Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof, and nonbossy deterministic matching mechanism and define a random matching mechanism by assigning agents to the roles in the mechanism via a uniform lottery. Given a profile of preferences, the lottery over outcomes that arises under the random matching mechanis...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Mathematics of operations research 2020-02, Vol.45 (1), p.353-368 |
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| container_title | Mathematics of operations research |
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| creator | Bade, Sophie |
| description | Fix a Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof, and nonbossy deterministic matching mechanism and define a random matching mechanism by assigning agents to the roles in the mechanism via a uniform lottery. Given a profile of preferences, the lottery over outcomes that arises under the random matching mechanism is identical to the lottery that arises under random serial dictatorship, where the order of dictators is uniformly distributed. This result extends the celebrated equivalence between the core from random endowments and random serial dictatorship to the grand set of all Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof, and nonbossy matching mechanisms. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1287/moor.2019.0987 |
| format | Article |
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| subjects | core from random endowments Dictators Gale’s top trading cycles Matching Mathematical analysis Operations research Pareto optimum Primary: 91B68 Primary: Matching Random variables |
| title | Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only |
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