Antitrust and positional arms races
The rational explanation is that before entry occurs, the expected benefit is higher than real and opportunity costs given the existing level of salaries and competition.12 Post-entry, continuing to invest in improved performance is also perfectly rational-the expected marginal benefit of effort is,...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Harvard journal of law and public policy 2007-06, Vol.30 (3), p.1023 |
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| description | The rational explanation is that before entry occurs, the expected benefit is higher than real and opportunity costs given the existing level of salaries and competition.12 Post-entry, continuing to invest in improved performance is also perfectly rational-the expected marginal benefit of effort is, indeed, higher than the cost.13 The irrational explanation for market entry is an overestimation of one's chances to win, which is quite typical for human beings.14 From an economic standpoint, a market for positional goods presents another application of zero-sum games.15 Once individuals are in the market and relative positions are established, additional investment in positional goods is mutually offsetting because the value derived from pure positional goods comes entirely from the relative positioning. |
| format | Article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0193-4872 |
| ispartof | Harvard journal of law and public policy, 2007-06, Vol.30 (3), p.1023 |
| issn | 0193-4872 2374-6572 |
| language | eng |
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| source | PAIS Index; HeinOnline Law Journal Library; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals |
| subjects | Agreements Antitrust law Antitrust laws Arms control Arms control & disarmament Competition Costs Economic aspects Economies of scale Executive compensation Higher education Market entry Market orientation Medical treatment Opportunity costs Political aspects Political power Restraint of trade Rule of reason Service industries Studies Wages & salaries Welfare |
| title | Antitrust and positional arms races |
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