Dual–class ownership structure and audit fees
A dual‐class share structure creates a separation between cash flow rights and voting rights. Dual‐class firms impact audit fees through their effect on supply/demand for auditing. This article examines the association between audit fees and dual‐class share structure for U.S. public firms. We find...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | International journal of auditing 2020-03, Vol.24 (1), p.163-176 |
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| container_title | International journal of auditing |
| container_volume | 24 |
| creator | Lobanova, Olesya Mishra, Suchismita Raghunandan, Kannan Aidov, Alexandre |
| description | A dual‐class share structure creates a separation between cash flow rights and voting rights. Dual‐class firms impact audit fees through their effect on supply/demand for auditing. This article examines the association between audit fees and dual‐class share structure for U.S. public firms. We find that a dual‐class share structure is associated with lower audit fees compared to single‐class firms. Further, within dual‐class firms, we find that the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights is negatively associated with audit fees. The results are consistent with the managerial incentive‐alignment effect and/or the insulation effect of a dual‐class share structure on the supply/demand for audit services. This study highlights that the ownership structure of a firm constitutes an important role in audit pricing. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/ijau.12185 |
| format | Article |
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This study highlights that the ownership structure of a firm constitutes an important role in audit pricing.</description><subject>Agency Theory</subject><subject>Audit Fees</subject><subject>Audits</subject><subject>Cash flow</subject><subject>Companies</subject><subject>Corporate Governance</subject><subject>Fees & charges</subject><subject>Ownership</subject><subject>Supply & demand</subject><subject>Voting rights</subject><issn>1090-6738</issn><issn>1099-1123</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kE1OwzAQhS0EEqWw4QSR2CGl9dhJnSyrQqGoEhu6tib-EYlCU-xYVXfcgRtyEtyGNbOZkeZ7M0-PkFugE4g1rRsME2BQ5GdkBLQsUwDGz08zTWeCF5fkyvuG0riDbESmDwHbn69v1aL3SbffGuff613iexdUH5xJcKsTDLruE2uMvyYXFltvbv76mGyWj2-L53T9-rRazNep4hTylBujMNeCW6WEUAVYRoFpLiwro8-qzDIQ0UPGNFbaIlaV0tRkYAVmBUc-JnfD3Z3rPoPxvWy64LbxpWQ8hxmHqI_U_UAp13nvjJU7V3-gO0ig8hiIPAYiT4FEGAZ4X7fm8A8pVy_zzaD5BbyVYzQ</recordid><startdate>202003</startdate><enddate>202003</enddate><creator>Lobanova, Olesya</creator><creator>Mishra, Suchismita</creator><creator>Raghunandan, Kannan</creator><creator>Aidov, Alexandre</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6332-1934</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5216-6449</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>202003</creationdate><title>Dual–class ownership structure and audit fees</title><author>Lobanova, Olesya ; Mishra, Suchismita ; Raghunandan, Kannan ; Aidov, Alexandre</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3015-3eeca5d73fcc77c81f2012d37f29111b9441700942dabdfaabbcd0e41f7a483a3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Agency Theory</topic><topic>Audit Fees</topic><topic>Audits</topic><topic>Cash flow</topic><topic>Companies</topic><topic>Corporate Governance</topic><topic>Fees & charges</topic><topic>Ownership</topic><topic>Supply & demand</topic><topic>Voting rights</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Lobanova, Olesya</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Mishra, Suchismita</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Raghunandan, Kannan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Aidov, Alexandre</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>International journal of auditing</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Lobanova, Olesya</au><au>Mishra, Suchismita</au><au>Raghunandan, Kannan</au><au>Aidov, Alexandre</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Dual–class ownership structure and audit fees</atitle><jtitle>International journal of auditing</jtitle><date>2020-03</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>24</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>163</spage><epage>176</epage><pages>163-176</pages><issn>1090-6738</issn><eissn>1099-1123</eissn><abstract>A dual‐class share structure creates a separation between cash flow rights and voting rights. Dual‐class firms impact audit fees through their effect on supply/demand for auditing. This article examines the association between audit fees and dual‐class share structure for U.S. public firms. We find that a dual‐class share structure is associated with lower audit fees compared to single‐class firms. Further, within dual‐class firms, we find that the divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights is negatively associated with audit fees. The results are consistent with the managerial incentive‐alignment effect and/or the insulation effect of a dual‐class share structure on the supply/demand for audit services. This study highlights that the ownership structure of a firm constitutes an important role in audit pricing.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/ijau.12185</doi><tpages>14</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6332-1934</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5216-6449</orcidid></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | International journal of auditing, 2020-03, Vol.24 (1), p.163-176 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Access via Wiley Online Library |
| subjects | Agency Theory Audit Fees Audits Cash flow Companies Corporate Governance Fees & charges Ownership Supply & demand Voting rights |
| title | Dual–class ownership structure and audit fees |
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