Insurance Fraud in a Rothschild-Stiglitz World

In this article, we model a competitive insurance market where policyholders privately have information about their probability of accident ex ante and know the state of the world ex post. We combine costly state verification without commitment and arguments from insurance contracting under adverse...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of risk and insurance 2020-03, Vol.87 (1), p.117-142
Hauptverfasser:	Boyer, M. Martin, Peter, Richard
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Adverse selection Economic aspects Insurance fraud Insurance industry Methods Risk assessment Safety and security measures
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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