No One Likes To Be Second Choice
Abstract A decision-maker wishes to fill a vacancy with a fixed wage. Candidates who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available. The candidates suffer a disutility from filling the position when they are ranked low on the decision-maker's preference list. However, t...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Economic journal (London) 2019-04, Vol.129 (619), p.1119-1138 |
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| container_title | The Economic journal (London) |
| container_volume | 129 |
| creator | Antler, Yair |
| description | Abstract
A decision-maker wishes to fill a vacancy with a fixed wage. Candidates who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available. The candidates suffer a disutility from filling the position when they are ranked low on the decision-maker's preference list. However, the decision-maker's preferences are his private information. Therefore, the candidates infer the decision-maker's preference list from information revealed by the number of failed offers. I explore the adverse effect of the social component in the candidates’ preferences on the decision maker's ability to recruit a suitable candidate. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/ecoj.12573 |
| format | Article |
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A decision-maker wishes to fill a vacancy with a fixed wage. Candidates who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available. The candidates suffer a disutility from filling the position when they are ranked low on the decision-maker's preference list. However, the decision-maker's preferences are his private information. Therefore, the candidates infer the decision-maker's preference list from information revealed by the number of failed offers. I explore the adverse effect of the social component in the candidates’ preferences on the decision maker's ability to recruit a suitable candidate.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0013-0133</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1468-0297</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12573</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>Candidates ; Decision making ; Economic theory ; Preferences ; Recruitment ; Side effects</subject><ispartof>The Economic journal (London), 2019-04, Vol.129 (619), p.1119-1138</ispartof><rights>2018 Royal Economic Society. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal Economic Society. 2019</rights><rights>2018 Royal Economic Society. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal Economic Society.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c415t-48bf9b4cc071a50305d13fa6deab781561ea1ccf9988d7fa716652c35e5118da3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c415t-48bf9b4cc071a50305d13fa6deab781561ea1ccf9988d7fa716652c35e5118da3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Antler, Yair</creatorcontrib><title>No One Likes To Be Second Choice</title><title>The Economic journal (London)</title><description>Abstract
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A decision-maker wishes to fill a vacancy with a fixed wage. Candidates who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available. The candidates suffer a disutility from filling the position when they are ranked low on the decision-maker's preference list. However, the decision-maker's preferences are his private information. Therefore, the candidates infer the decision-maker's preference list from information revealed by the number of failed offers. I explore the adverse effect of the social component in the candidates’ preferences on the decision maker's ability to recruit a suitable candidate.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1111/ecoj.12573</doi><tpages>20</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0013-0133 |
| ispartof | The Economic journal (London), 2019-04, Vol.129 (619), p.1119-1138 |
| issn | 0013-0133 1468-0297 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2350425100 |
| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
| subjects | Candidates Decision making Economic theory Preferences Recruitment Side effects |
| title | No One Likes To Be Second Choice |
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