The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff
Study is given to the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies. A model, applied to the setting of tariffs, indicates the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as subsidies, tariffs, taxes, and regulatory decisions. By contributing to political campaigns, special interest...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | The American economic review 1978-05, Vol.68 (2), p.246-250 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 250 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 246 |
| container_title | The American economic review |
| container_volume | 68 |
| creator | Brock, William A. Magee, Stephen P. |
| description | Study is given to the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies. A model, applied to the setting of tariffs, indicates the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as subsidies, tariffs, taxes, and regulatory decisions. By contributing to political campaigns, special interest lobbies generate economic returns, such as revenue generated from higher tariffs for import-competing industries through higher product prices. Lobbies try to maximize net economic returns. Emphasis is placed on Olson's discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns. Politicians weigh the unfavorable association with a lobby against the favorable effects of special interest money. Equilibrium tariff positions are determined for each politician in a political campaign. |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_233043485</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>1816698</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>1816698</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-j262t-2bd2b7a6ccd7b6197238b57640eeb6e1c1a8c36488cfd6a59af774fc2bb975793</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp1zk1LxDAQBuAgCtbVf-Ch6LmQ7w9vWlZdWFCwnkuSJtjSbWqSPfjvbVmvnmaG92FmzkCBFKWVUBKdgwJCiCuJJb4EVykNcJ2RKMBT8-XKrQ1TOPQ2lcGXH7OzvR7L3ZRddCmX72Hs8xI-lKutdXIry0vf6Nh7fw0uvB6Tu_mrG_D5vG3q12r_9rKrH_fVgDnOFTYdNkJzazthOFICE2mY4BQ6Z7hDFmlpCadSWt9xzZT2QlBvsTFKMKHIBtyd9s4xfB-Xz9ohHOO0nGwxIZASKtmC7v9DCEvFKWUML-r2pIaUQ2zn2B90_GmRRJwrSX4BP_xa5A</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1289644552</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff</title><source>Jstor Complete Legacy</source><source>Business Source Complete</source><source>Periodicals Index Online</source><creator>Brock, William A. ; Magee, Stephen P.</creator><creatorcontrib>Brock, William A. ; Magee, Stephen P.</creatorcontrib><description>Study is given to the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies. A model, applied to the setting of tariffs, indicates the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as subsidies, tariffs, taxes, and regulatory decisions. By contributing to political campaigns, special interest lobbies generate economic returns, such as revenue generated from higher tariffs for import-competing industries through higher product prices. Lobbies try to maximize net economic returns. Emphasis is placed on Olson's discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns. Politicians weigh the unfavorable association with a lobby against the favorable effects of special interest money. Equilibrium tariff positions are determined for each politician in a political campaign.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0002-8282</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1944-7981</identifier><identifier>CODEN: AENRAA</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Menasha, Wis: The American Economic Association</publisher><subject>Campaign contributions ; Decentralization, Bureaucracy, and Government ; Economic models ; Economic theory ; Economic value ; Economics ; Elections ; Government bureaucracy ; Interest groups ; Lobbying ; Political campaigns ; Political elections ; Politicians ; Politics ; Returns ; Tariffs</subject><ispartof>The American economic review, 1978-05, Vol.68 (2), p.246-250</ispartof><rights>Copyright 1978 American Economic Association</rights><rights>Copyright American Economic Association May 1978</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1816698$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/1816698$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,27846,57992,58225</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Brock, William A.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Magee, Stephen P.</creatorcontrib><title>The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff</title><title>The American economic review</title><description>Study is given to the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies. A model, applied to the setting of tariffs, indicates the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as subsidies, tariffs, taxes, and regulatory decisions. By contributing to political campaigns, special interest lobbies generate economic returns, such as revenue generated from higher tariffs for import-competing industries through higher product prices. Lobbies try to maximize net economic returns. Emphasis is placed on Olson's discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns. Politicians weigh the unfavorable association with a lobby against the favorable effects of special interest money. Equilibrium tariff positions are determined for each politician in a political campaign.</description><subject>Campaign contributions</subject><subject>Decentralization, Bureaucracy, and Government</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Economic value</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Elections</subject><subject>Government bureaucracy</subject><subject>Interest groups</subject><subject>Lobbying</subject><subject>Political campaigns</subject><subject>Political elections</subject><subject>Politicians</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>Returns</subject><subject>Tariffs</subject><issn>0002-8282</issn><issn>1944-7981</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1978</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>K30</sourceid><recordid>eNp1zk1LxDAQBuAgCtbVf-Ch6LmQ7w9vWlZdWFCwnkuSJtjSbWqSPfjvbVmvnmaG92FmzkCBFKWVUBKdgwJCiCuJJb4EVykNcJ2RKMBT8-XKrQ1TOPQ2lcGXH7OzvR7L3ZRddCmX72Hs8xI-lKutdXIry0vf6Nh7fw0uvB6Tu_mrG_D5vG3q12r_9rKrH_fVgDnOFTYdNkJzazthOFICE2mY4BQ6Z7hDFmlpCadSWt9xzZT2QlBvsTFKMKHIBtyd9s4xfB-Xz9ohHOO0nGwxIZASKtmC7v9DCEvFKWUML-r2pIaUQ2zn2B90_GmRRJwrSX4BP_xa5A</recordid><startdate>19780501</startdate><enddate>19780501</enddate><creator>Brock, William A.</creator><creator>Magee, Stephen P.</creator><general>The American Economic Association</general><general>American Economic Association</general><scope>EOLOZ</scope><scope>FKUCP</scope><scope>HZAIM</scope><scope>K30</scope><scope>PAAUG</scope><scope>PAWHS</scope><scope>PAWZZ</scope><scope>PAXOH</scope><scope>PBHAV</scope><scope>PBQSW</scope><scope>PBYQZ</scope><scope>PCIWU</scope><scope>PCMID</scope><scope>PCZJX</scope><scope>PDGRG</scope><scope>PDWWI</scope><scope>PETMR</scope><scope>PFVGT</scope><scope>PGXDX</scope><scope>PIHIL</scope><scope>PISVA</scope><scope>PJCTQ</scope><scope>PJTMS</scope><scope>PLCHJ</scope><scope>PMHAD</scope><scope>PNQDJ</scope><scope>POUND</scope><scope>PPLAD</scope><scope>PQAPC</scope><scope>PQCAN</scope><scope>PQCMW</scope><scope>PQEME</scope><scope>PQHKH</scope><scope>PQMID</scope><scope>PQNCT</scope><scope>PQNET</scope><scope>PQSCT</scope><scope>PQSET</scope><scope>PSVJG</scope><scope>PVMQY</scope><scope>PZGFC</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K9.</scope></search><sort><creationdate>19780501</creationdate><title>The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff</title><author>Brock, William A. ; Magee, Stephen P.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-j262t-2bd2b7a6ccd7b6197238b57640eeb6e1c1a8c36488cfd6a59af774fc2bb975793</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1978</creationdate><topic>Campaign contributions</topic><topic>Decentralization, Bureaucracy, and Government</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Economic value</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Elections</topic><topic>Government bureaucracy</topic><topic>Interest groups</topic><topic>Lobbying</topic><topic>Political campaigns</topic><topic>Political elections</topic><topic>Politicians</topic><topic>Politics</topic><topic>Returns</topic><topic>Tariffs</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Brock, William A.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Magee, Stephen P.</creatorcontrib><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segment 01</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segment 04</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segment 26</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - West</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - MEA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - West</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segments 1-50</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - MEA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - West</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - MEA</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><jtitle>The American economic review</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Brock, William A.</au><au>Magee, Stephen P.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff</atitle><jtitle>The American economic review</jtitle><date>1978-05-01</date><risdate>1978</risdate><volume>68</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>246</spage><epage>250</epage><pages>246-250</pages><issn>0002-8282</issn><eissn>1944-7981</eissn><coden>AENRAA</coden><abstract>Study is given to the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies. A model, applied to the setting of tariffs, indicates the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as subsidies, tariffs, taxes, and regulatory decisions. By contributing to political campaigns, special interest lobbies generate economic returns, such as revenue generated from higher tariffs for import-competing industries through higher product prices. Lobbies try to maximize net economic returns. Emphasis is placed on Olson's discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns. Politicians weigh the unfavorable association with a lobby against the favorable effects of special interest money. Equilibrium tariff positions are determined for each politician in a political campaign.</abstract><cop>Menasha, Wis</cop><pub>The American Economic Association</pub><tpages>5</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0002-8282 |
| ispartof | The American economic review, 1978-05, Vol.68 (2), p.246-250 |
| issn | 0002-8282 1944-7981 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_233043485 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | Campaign contributions Decentralization, Bureaucracy, and Government Economic models Economic theory Economic value Economics Elections Government bureaucracy Interest groups Lobbying Political campaigns Political elections Politicians Politics Returns Tariffs |
| title | The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-09T21%3A32%3A06IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The%20Economics%20of%20Special%20Interest%20Politics:%20The%20Case%20of%20the%20Tariff&rft.jtitle=The%20American%20economic%20review&rft.au=Brock,%20William%20A.&rft.date=1978-05-01&rft.volume=68&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=246&rft.epage=250&rft.pages=246-250&rft.issn=0002-8282&rft.eissn=1944-7981&rft.coden=AENRAA&rft_id=info:doi/&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E1816698%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1289644552&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=1816698&rfr_iscdi=true |