Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior
An approach is developed for the understanding of voluntary collective action. A model using this approach predicts Pareto optimal provision of a nonexcludable public good in the case of identical actors with perfect information. The model does not postulate any coercion in the provision of the publ...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The American economic review 1978-05, Vol.68 (2), p.251-255 |
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| container_title | The American economic review |
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| creator | Guttman, Joel M. |
| description | An approach is developed for the understanding of voluntary collective action. A model using this approach predicts Pareto optimal provision of a nonexcludable public good in the case of identical actors with perfect information. The model does not postulate any coercion in the provision of the public good and avoids limiting assumptions of special characteristics of public goods. The model's prediction of Pareto optimality is stronger than the Coase theorem. Although the process involves no negotiations or enforcement of property rights, it yields a Pareto optimal provision of public goods, given perfect information and identical actors. The Coase Theorem asserts that actors can attain socially optimal outcomes through explicit negotiations and enforcement of property rights. |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0002-8282 |
| ispartof | The American economic review, 1978-05, Vol.68 (2), p.251-255 |
| issn | 0002-8282 1944-7981 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_233033349 |
| source | Business Source Complete (EB_SDU_P3); Periodicals Index Online; JSTOR |
| subjects | Agreements Behavior Coercion Collective Collective action Decentralization, Bureaucracy, and Government Economic models Games Government bureaucracy Group size Marginal benefits Modeling Optimization Pareto efficiency Property rights Public Public good Public goods Rate setting Voluntary |
| title | Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior |
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