A Note on Sequential Auctions
An exploration is made into multiobject, sequential, private-value auctions. A simple variant is considered in which each bidder's valuations are identically distributed across the objects to be auctioned but are not perfectly correlated. It is found that even though bidders are risk-neutral, m...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The American economic review 1994-06, Vol.84 (3), p.653-657 |
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| container_title | The American economic review |
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| creator | Bernhardt, Dan Scoones, David |
| description | An exploration is made into multiobject, sequential, private-value auctions. A simple variant is considered in which each bidder's valuations are identically distributed across the objects to be auctioned but are not perfectly correlated. It is found that even though bidders are risk-neutral, mean sale prices fall. In addition, a determination is made of which object should be auctioned first when bidder valuations are not identically distributed across objects. An attempt is made to capture phenomena such as bidding by a firm for construction contracts, oil drilling concessions, or workers, where because of constraints imposed by its physical resources or the number of its job openings, each bidder is limited in the number of objects it can acquire. |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0002-8282 |
| ispartof | The American economic review, 1994-06, Vol.84 (3), p.653-657 |
| issn | 0002-8282 1944-7981 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_233029368 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | Auctions Bidders Bidding Discounts Economic models Economic theory Expected values Risk aversion Statistical variance Studies |
| title | A Note on Sequential Auctions |
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