Performance Contingencies in CEO Equity Awards and Debt Contracting

We find that firms that grant performance-contingent (p-c) equity awards with accounting-based vesting conditions to their CEOs have lower cost of debt and less restrictive loan terms. The benefits of p-c accounting-based awards on debt financing are greater when the moral hazard problem faced by de...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Accounting review 2019-09, Vol.94 (5), p.57-82
Hauptverfasser:	Bizjak, John M., Kalpathy, Swaminathan L., Mihov, Vassil T.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Accounting Chief executive officers Chief executives Contingencies Credit ratings Debt financing Employee awards Financing Moral dilemmas Moral hazard Stockholders
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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